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MUTATING MARKS: REFUSING TO LOSE THE 
TRADEMARK TRAIL 
Robert W. Emerson∗ & Katharine C. Collins∗∗ 
 ABSTRACT—This article examines and synthesizes several criticisms 
underlying the expansion of trademark rights, and the sometimes irrational 
results thereof. The abandonment of trademark law’s foundations, in 
particular categories of marks, is illustrated most saliently where marks have 
been allowed to encapsulate meaning and value in and of themselves, 
unattributable to any qualities or connections to product or source. This 
touches on, and bridges the gap, between areas which have received 
academic attention for their problematic evolutions, including naked 
licensing, strike suits, cultural and particularly sports-centric marks, and 
sensory marks. Trademark doctrines such as the consumer perception for 
confusion, and the spectrum of distinction, used to grant and organize marks, 
are discussed. This allows us to consider how to reinvigorate commitment to 
essential trademark jurisprudence. 
The first Section reviews a few fundamental concepts underlying and 
organizing the trademark system, in order to explain where its boundaries 
belong. Sections II and III detail different considerations that emerged in step 
with the expansion of a trademark’s purpose far beyond that of a source 
signifier. They address matters, such as inherent goodwill, that have been 
largely ignored to the detriment of the public interest, and others, such as 
functionality, that have not been applied to their full, logical extent. 
Section IV discusses the influence mark holders have had in shaping 
this progression—one of lowering requirements and escalating powers—and 
it considers the unreasonable consequences thereof. Finally, Section V 
indicates how courts and regulatory agencies may bring a significant portion 
of the trademarks, which have gone awry, back into the fold. Estoppel and a 
reconstituting of stronger evidentiary standards can help to ensure powerful 
mark holders seeking legal support for their market dominance actually meet 
high burdens to do so. The current trademark law framework leaves too 
much power in some mark holders’ hands, but it contains the seeds for 
innovative parties and lawyers to create more sensible trademark policies. 
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I. TRADEMARK BACKGROUND 
Trademarks have a long past, rooted in product association with makers 
and owners, as—for example—ancient artists signed their pottery and early 
ranchers wielded their cattle prods.1 The law of trademarks naturally aligns 
with business, and one could argue that marketing (specifically, branding) 
and trademarks are inseparable. 
A. Justifications 
The trademark’s purpose always has been to indicate the origin or 
source of commercial goods.2 Protection in American law is based upon a 
 
 1 Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222, 222–
24 (1983); see TONY MARTINO, TRADEMARK DILUTION 18–22 (1996) (discussing the origins of 
proprietary marks in practice and law from ancient times through the Middle Ages). 
 2 Diamond, supra note 1, at 222. 
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trademark’s informative value to consumers.3 Previously, such marks 
represented a consistent source of goods, expressed the quality conveyed to 
consumers, and protected consumers from being misled. As the implied 
“expressive content” that these marks contained grew, theories justifying 
their existence expanded to include the marks’ ability to reduce consumers’ 
search costs with their symbolic information. This greater economic 
efficiency meets two worthy objectives of legislation by benefiting both 
consumers and the free market as a whole.4 
Businesses were also empowered by mark rights, which served as 
useful tools allowing them both to build reputations and to expand through 
the mark’s growing influence. As a consequence, advantages also accrued to 
the market, as better-informed consumers could more easily recognize high-
quality producers. However, much of trademark expansion has been driven 
by the incorrect notion that trademark rights are intended to serve the 
producer’s interest, disembodied from concerns of the consumer and thus of 
society and markets overall.5 Especially as businesses are, overwhelmingly, 
the main participants in doctrine-shaping activity, their interests frequently 
have come to overshadow the basic goals of trademark law.6 
B. Uniqueness among Intellectual Property 
The original purpose of trademarks is unique among the three major 
domains of intellectual property: trademark, copyright, and patent law. 
Those domains have been justified by incentivizing a social benefit. Patented 
inventions and copyrighted expressions of creative work are thought to 
enrich society prima facie. Granting limited, exclusive rights to inventors 
and creators offers the possibility of profit, which encourages contributions 
to society.7 Trademark value does not stand alone in this way. However, only 
the informational link implied by the mark is meant to be protected by law. 
In this context, it is unsurprising that trademarks are the only form of 
intellectual property granted an unlimited lifespan of protection. There is no 
inherent value being kept from the rest of society since these marks are 
 
 3 Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 
YALE L.J. 1165, 1184–87 (1948), reprinted in 108 YALE L.J. 1619 (1999). 
 4 William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 
199, 206-07 (1991). 
 5 Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 
1705–10 (1999). 
 6 See Brown, supra note 3, at 1167 (“[W]hat appear to be private disputes among hucksters almost 
invariably touch the public welfare. We shall therefore be concerned to ask, when courts protect trade 
symbols, whether their decisions further public as well as private goals.”). 
 7 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO PUB. NO. 450(E), WHAT IS 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? 3 (2004), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/450/wipo_pub_
450.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2018) [hereinafter WIPO]. 
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simply transmitting source information.8 For copyright and patent law, 
ownership is finite and put to rest after fair compensation, which allows work 
to subsequently enter the public domain, for free use by all.9 
This difference of purpose also leads to other distinguishing features of 
trademark law among intellectual property. In the Trade-Mark Cases, 
referring to copyright standards, the Supreme Court ruled that “originality is 
required.”10 Even more bluntly, the patent statute11 states that non-
obviousness is a pre-requisite for protection. However, trademarks lack a 
similar condition of originality. An idea–expression dichotomy also defines 
forms of intellectual property except trademark.12 Copyright law stipulates 
protections as limited to a fixed expression of the creative work, and patents 
take the form of precisely detailed instructions for making and using the 
physical invention. No intellectual property rights are granted to an idea 
alone. Though trademark applications require a mark’s physical nature to be 
fully described, from design and placement, there is a lack of verbatim 
restrictions to a singular form of the mark. Indeed, “standard character” 
marks may encompass ownership of a word or phrase “without claim to any 
particular font style, size, or color.”13 
These distinctions from the other breeds of intellectual property all stem 
from trademark’s nature as a conduit of information rather than a creation 
itself. However, as marks have largely become treated as valuable objects 
themselves,14 the lack of borders for these protected expressions has allowed 
trademarks to escape the bounds of their legal justification. 
C. Spectrum of Distinctiveness 
In granting trademarks, a spectrum of distinctiveness is applied.15 This 
determination is to be made in specific context of the goods at hand.16 At the 
top of the spectrum, and thus immediately registrable, are fanciful marks, 
 
 8 For an argument on such a public interest given the modern relationship between trademarks and 
the public, see Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 
YALE L.J. 1717 (1999). 
 9 WIPO, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
 10 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
 11 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011). 
 12 Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View on the Idea/Expressions Dichotomy in Copyright 
Law, 16 CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS. 3, 4 (2003). 
 13 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(a) (2016). 
 14 Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Law, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1227, 1256 (2014). 
 15 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (defining the 
categories of distinctiveness). 
 16 Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 892 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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original words or symbols, such as “Kodak.”17 The next “inherently 
distinctive” and thus immediately registrable marks are arbitrary, where 
consideration of the context of use applies.18 These are “a known word used 
in an unexpected or uncommon way” according to the Supreme Court.19 A 
common trait of an arbitrary mark, such as Apple Computer,20 is that it 
essentially creates a new homophone. 
Finally, the last inherently distinctive class is the suggestive mark. 
Suggestive marks are not immediately descriptive of the product, but are at 
least a small mental leap beyond obviousness. There are other linguistic 
details that may negate registration, such as “the best beer in America” being 
held too broadly laudatory to effectively distinguish the product.21 A fine, but 
critical, line lies at the determination between suggestive and the non-
inherently distinctive, merely descriptive marks.22 Trademark law has been 
clear—marks should not be a tool to silence competition in the marketplace.23 
Adjectives plainly describing a good’s nature must be available to all 
competitors to inform consumers about goods. Thus, descriptive marks are 
not registrable without proof of “acquired distinctiveness” in the public’s 
mind.24 
Outside this spectrum are generic terms25 which are never registrable.26 
The test of genericism is if the relevant purchasing public understands the 
word as the “genus” of a type of goods, as opposed to referring to a good 
 
 17 Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 943 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 18 Id. at 943 n.6. 
 19 Nautilus Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing 
Interstellar Starship, 304 F.3d at 943 n.6). 
 20 See Apple Trademark List, APPLE (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-
property/trademark/appletmlist.html [https://perma.cc/AB8A-SC5E]. 
 21 Boston Beer Co. Ltd. P’ship, 198 F.3d 1370, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 22 Nautilus Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 23 In fact, beyond the competitive values to be upheld by barring purely descriptive terms, in other 
commentary or cases outside the scope of this article, the use of trademark in creating an extremely strong, 
almost generic, brand name may be considered a factor in evaluating whether there is an unfair, 
monopolistic business practices. See Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics 
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 68 (Spr. 2005). 
 24 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2015); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212 (2017) (hereinafter, “T.M.E.P.”), available at http://www.uspto.gov
/trademark/guides-and-manuals/tmep-archives [https://perma.cc/B6M6-38Q2] (acquired distinctiveness 
or secondary meaning). 
 25 See Vanessa Bowman Pierce, If It Walks Like a Duck and Quacks Like a Duck, Shouldn’t It Be a 
Duck?: How a “Functional” Approach Ameliorates the Discontinuity Between the “Primary 
Significance” Tests for Genericness and Secondary Meaning, 37 N.M. L. REV. 147, 185 (2007) (arguing 
for integration of primary significance determination with genus determination for a more functional 
perspective). 
 26 Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 943 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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coming from a single source.27 In establishing the public’s conception of the 
word’s primary significance,28 one can use a variety of sources, including 
dictionary definitions,29 publications, and online search results. If the term is 
commonly used to refer to a class of products beyond the mark holder’s good 
or service, the term may be generic. Even for registered marks, “genericide”30 
is a looming possibility, compelling mark holders to protect their marks by 
stopping third parties from misusing it.31 Even a formerly distinctive mark 
may become mentally reclassified to represent a whole genus of goods, 
which puts the mark in peril of cancellation. This is why mark holders, to 
prevent meaning of a term from being altered, pursue perceived infringers. 
Even non-interested parties, including the media, are often reprimanded for 
“misuse” of a trademark that erodes its meaning, and holders themselves 
should be wary of destroying their rights by using their marks meaninglessly. 
II. GOODWILL 
Goodwill has played a prominent role in the expansion of modern 
trademark law.32 However, the concept has only acknowledged in a rather 
lopsided way, ignored and thus effectively stymied where unattributable to 
mark holders. Goodwill is “loyalty that a business earns from its 
customers.”33 Reputation-related advantage, the tendency of consumers to 
make repurchases,34 and other hard-to-quantify definitions are all used in an 
effort to characterize goodwill. Goodwill is accounted for in financial 
statements at staggering amounts by some businesses,35 so it is certainly a 
 
 27 H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 28 In re Murphy Door Bed Co., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1030, 1033 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (“[T]he test of 
whether or not a word has a generic connotation is the primary significance that term has to the purchasing 
public.”). 
 29 See In re Murphy Door Bed Co., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1031–32 (stating dictionaries “are 
credible evidence going to the perception of the term by the public”). 
 30 See Pierce, supra note 25. 
 31 See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
585, 589 (2008). 
 32 See Apostolos Chronopoulos, Goodwill Appropriation as a Distinct Theory of Trademark 
Liability: A Study on the Misappropriation Rationale in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law, 22 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J., 253 (2013). 
 33 Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Goodwill: Take a Sad Song and Make It Better, 46 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 349, 352 (2013) (citing court opinions and legal and business texts). For a more elaborate 
articulation, see Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark 
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547 (2005). 
 34 Id. at 583. 
 35 See generally Financial reporting developments: Intangibles—Goodwill and other, ERNST & 
YOUNG (2009), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/FinancialReportingDevelopments_
BB1499_GoodwillIntangible_November_2009/$FILE/FinancialReportingDevelopments_BB1499_Goo
dwillIntangible_November%202009.pdf (analyzing accounting standards for measuring goodwill on a 
company balance sheet). [https://perma.cc/YEM6-H5GG]. 
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monetary reality. In modern consumer research—both as an accounting 
concept and as a market reality—it is recognized that goodwill is of the 
utmost importance to protect, and it is often embodied by the trademarks a 
business owns.36 
A. Changing Nature 
While trademarks and implied goodwill were initially confined to a 
specific product only, trouble arose from misleading associative links. Aunt 
Jemima’s pancake mix became popular around 1900; by 1922 the name and 
jolly image had been co-opted by other companies to sell highly similar 
products from flour to syrup. The judiciary set precedent by expanding Aunt 
Jemima’s trademark rights to protect brand goodwill beyond pancake mix to 
reach these closely related product categories.37 The reasoning for this 
expansion, that these offerings were similar enough that consumers may be 
confused as to the source, or rely on Aunt Jemima’s reputation in their 
decision-making, is convincing. It was also recognized that the owners of 
Aunt Jemima might be interested in branching out and taking their reputation 
with them into other product categories where they already had specialized 
interest and experience. 
Expansion of goodwill’s power has come with the reciprocal rise of 
licensing trademarks.38 These agreements allow a third party to utilize the 
mark in question, originally for identical products where the consumer’s 
concern likely is not the product’s literal source but its adherence to uniform 
quality standards; these other producers are, of course, not free to 
misrepresent that they are the originating source itself, but in theory 
producers must uphold the quality standards a mark represents. Where 
licensing departs from the intended information transmission function is 
where it becomes “naked.” Naked licensing is licensing of a mark without 
any quality control over the associated products, by the trademark owner. If 
owners do not ensure anything about a product bearing their marks, the 
marks are essentially meaningless and are not serving an objective rooted in 
trademark’s source-designating or consumer-protecting justifications.39 
 
 36 Posner, supra note 23. For criticism of how this priority arose, see Lemley, supra note 5. 
 37 Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 409–10 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 38 See Irene Calboli, The Case for a Limited Protection of Trademark Merchandising, 2011 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 865, 879 (2011). 
 39 Rudolph J. Kuss, The Naked Licensing Doctrine Exposed: How the Courts Interpret the Lanham 
Act to Require Licensors to Police Their Licensees & Why this Requirement Conflicts with Modern 
Licensing Realities and the Goals of Trademark Law, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV 361, 365 (2005). 
Recently, this rather remote trademark restriction gained press coverage when Belgian-owned Budweiser 
temporarily “renamed” its flagship beer “America,” for the summer of 2016. Company representatives 
outright acknowledge this as a means to capitalize on patriotic contemporary events, from an Olympic 
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Merchandising flipped the dynamics of licensing by utilizing the 
goodwill embodied in a mark to sell unrelated and promotional goods. 
Goodwill began to be treated as a property in its own right, as opposed to a 
nebulous idea.40 The intent of protecting consumers from being misled by 
goodwill misappropriation took a backseat as goodwill’s power was 
recognized. This transformed into a “right”41 to profit off of goodwill, which 
has since been conflated as a wholesale justification of trademarks’ 
existence. In advancing goodwill-protection as a rationale for trademarks, it 
is often argued that the markholder invested in the mark, creating the 
goodwill it expresses, and that others shall not “reap what they have not 
sown.” This belies the distinguishing feature of trademark from other 
intellectual property—that no act of creativity is accounted for in the balance 
of trademark protection. 
B. Inherent Goodwill 
Circumstances exist where the intrinsic value of a mark predates its use 
as one, where nothing is being “sown” at all, or at least it is unclear to whom 
such “sowing” should be attributed. Minor statutory restrictions can be seen 
to reflect acknowledgement of this concept of “inherent goodwill,” or the 
value that marks might convey apart from a designation of any source. For 
instance, there is a prohibition on a mark which “consists of or comprises the 
flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any State or 
municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof.”42 While 
this may serve to avoid incorrect source-designation, in effect, it also ropes 
off official public icons from private use or control. This intuitively makes 
 
games to a presidential election. While the packaging replaced its trademark with the word, no attempt 
was made to file for trademark protection. See Jessica Roy, There’s no law against Budweiser calling its 
beer ‘America,’ L. A. TIMES (May 10, 2016, 7:59 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-budweiser-
america-trademark-20160510-snap-htmlstory.html [http://perma.cc/3ZTA-TZPC]. 
 40 See Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark 
Law, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 105 (2005). The mark holder’s goodwill interests are often a paramount concern 
of courts ruling against trademark infringers. In Facebook, Inc. v. Teachbook.com LLC, 819 F.Supp.2d 
764 (N.D. Ill. 2011), the court upheld an infringement claim due to the defendant’s misleading domain 
name: “one can imagine teachers searching the Internet for www.facebook.com and hitting upon 
www.teachbook.com. And even though these same teachers might also read Teachbook’s attempt to 
define itself as an alternative to Facebook, the initial interest stems from the goodwill associated with 
Facebook, not Teachbook.” Id. at 783 (emphasis added). 
 41 See Charles W. Grimes & Gregory J. Battersby, The Protection of Merchandising Properties, 69 
TRADEMARK REP. 431, 432 (1979). To use the Facebook, Inc. v. Teachbook.com, LLC case (supra note 
40) as an example, the focus would then be more Facebook’s property interest than consumers’ protection 
from misinformation. 
 42 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b); see also In re William Connors Paint Mfg. Co., 27 App. D.C. 389 (1906); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:21 (2015) (regarding the official seal, insignia, symbol, emblem, coat of arms, or 
logo). 
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sense for public imagery, but also begs the question where the limits of this 
respect are drawn. Native Americans are granted a detailed system of 
trademark restrictions to protect their cultural representations and totems.43 
This is certainly not to say that such a system has been foolproof or effective; 
issues of the commercialization of meaningful terms into brands, such as 
Jeep Cherokee, Mohawk Paper Company, and Crazy Horse Malt Liquor, 
have been raised.44 However, this statute reflects cultural protection, which 
is broader than the official seals of a nation, though theoretical boundaries 
are unarticulated. 
The way some marks are now commercialized requires consideration 
for this fundamental concept: inherent goodwill.45 Some marks carry with 
them pre-existing value. If courts are to accept goodwill protection-function 
as a freestanding justification for trademark law, and people should not “reap 
what they have not sown,”46 then who is the rightful beneficiary when none 
have demonstrable proof of value “sown?” The recognition of levels of 
distinction in granting marks implicitly acknowledge that, in language, “no 
term is an island,” because it must be considered in light of the particular 
product and audience, and because meanings are not monolithic. Assuming 
secondary meaning for fanciful marks is practical as they lack pre-
established linguistic tethers. Suggestive marks47 capitalize on pre-existing 
meanings of the word(s) in question, with an often minute but meaningful 
distinction rising above plain descriptiveness. For the descriptive marks 
already obviously tied to their subject matter, requiring proof of secondary 
meaning is a sound constraint on the power of trademark law. In light of the 
reality of modern commerce areas where trademark law would benefit 
greatly from a more contextual and functional consideration of predominant 
mark meanings that might be equally strong as a dictionary definition, 
especially for relevant consumers.48 
 
 43 Brian Zark, Use of Native American Tribal Names as Marks, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 537, 538–43 
(2015). 
 44 WHAT’S IN A NAME? CAN NATIVE AMERICANS CONTROL OUTSIDERS’ USE OF THEIR 
TRIBAL NAMES?, CULTURAL SURVIVAL (September 1994), https://www.culturalsurvival.org/
publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/whats-name-can-native-americans-control-outsiders-use 
[https://perma.cc/D3GU-C79Q]. 
 45 See Bone, supra note 33, at 598 (“Inherent goodwill includes the public meanings associated with 
the mark itself, independent of the product to which it is connected and independent of any particular 
brand or firm.”). 
 46 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericicity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 404 (1990) (discussing trademark law’s adoption of the “reap 
where one has not sown” concept for consumers claiming ownership of value in the marks). 
 47 As delineated by the spectrum of distinctiveness, supra I. C. Spectrum of Distinctiveness. 
 48 For a thoughtful look at how to interpret an audience’s interpretation of a mark, see Laura A. 
Heymann, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP 
REPOSITORY (2008), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/194. 
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C. Idioms and Atmospherics 
Trademarks may come pre-loaded with a wealth of associations in the 
public’s mind. This is clear from the recognition that certain non-descriptive 
terms are “arbitrary” in relation to a particular subject, while others are more 
closely related and thus “suggestive.” However, there are many examples in 
which accurately perceiving a term’s well-established connotation or 
perhaps even its actual definition requires substantial consideration of the 
cultural context in which it exists. 
An idiom, summarized from definitions given by Merriam Webster, is 
a grammatically peculiar expression, characteristic to the type of art, person, 
class, community, or area, with a separate meaning of its own, not contained 
in the separate words.49 One that attracted national attention in the context of 
trademarks is “who dat.” First usage of this phrase dates back to late 1800s 
minstrel shows and poems, sticking around for the turn of the century to 
appear alongside jazz culture and, reflexively, blackface.50 It was said to be 
a responsive catchphrase for World War II fighter pilots51 before turning to 
a sports cheer52 at historically African-American high schools and colleges 
around Louisiana. In line with its musical origins, the phrase’s first 
documented association with the New Orleans Saints (a team in the National 
Football League (NFL)) came in 1983, when a New Orleans singer blended 
it alongside “When the Saints Go Marching In” in a video with the NFL 
players.53 The term continues to bloom in African-American music—sans 
sports references. Among many others, it was rapped by a native of New 
Orleans, Lil Wayne, in his song, “A Milli” in 2008.54 
 
 49 Idiom, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idiom 
[https://perma.cc/NG87-GB43]. 
 50 Dave Walker, ‘Who Dat?’ Popularized by New Orleans Saints Fans When ‘Everybody was 
Looking for the Sign, NOLA TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 13, 2010, 7:16 AM), http://www.nola.com/saints
/index.ssf/2010/01/who_dat_popularized_when_every.html [http://perma.cc/JFS6-S7JK]. 
 51 Erin Z. Bass, Who is Who Dat?, DEEP SOUTH MAGAZINE (Jan. 28, 2010), 
http://deepsouthmag.com/2010/01/who-is-who-dat/ [https://perma.cc/KTD4-GUV4]. 
 52 Amy Davidson, The Strange Case of Who Dat, NEW YORKER (Feb. 9, 2010), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/the-strange-case-of-who-dat [https://perma.cc/2YZK-
XSZL]. 
 53 Dbg53, Who Dat featuring Aaron Neville & the TopCats, YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfEjZunhEvY (documenting players’ excellent dancing and 
acknowledging the cheer as a “unique blend of New Orleans dialect,” as well as the Saints General 
Manager discussing genesis of the chant by fans) (“Every place we went last fall we’d see ‘who dat’ 
signs, we would hear the ‘who dat’ chant. Our players enjoyed it, and we thought ‘why not?’ And I think 
this will grow into something real big.”). 
 54 LIL’ WAYNE, A MILLI (Cash Money Records 2008) (saying “who dat” at 2:25, unlikely in 
reference to the Saints, given Wayne’s public statements of support for the Green Bay Packers NFL 
football team, as opposed to the Saints, in interviews available at https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=C6mNpVzuerw). 
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The New Orleans Saints earned their first bid to the Super Bowl in 
2010. That, in turn, led to a flurry of cease and desist letters, from the NFL 
to numerous Louisiana businesses, claiming the phrase “who dat” as 
exclusive property of the NFL.55 The league held those rights in Florida, 
where the championship game was to be held. “If ‘who dat’ is used in a 
manner to refer to Saints football, then the Saints own the rights” was the 
position of NFL spokespersons, extrapolating ownership to include a fleur-
de-lis symbol or black and gold color scheme as well.56 The response was 
loud public indignation ranging from bipartisan retorts by Louisiana public 
officials57 to outcries that the NFL engaged in opportunistic cultural 
profiteering,58 among many other complaints.59 These criticisms demanded 
the NFL respect a concept quite similar to copyright’s “public domain,” 
which in a classical sense would not be a concern of trademark law. While 
originality of the mark itself is unnecessary, originality of its meaning—or 
at least the lack of a pre-existing associative link—is allegedly the 
foundation of a trademark holder’s right. If the relevant purchasing public 
consists of New Orleans or even Louisiana residents, “who dat” is 
inextricably linked to their community and culture. Beyond its constant link 
to southern Louisiana geographically, the term closely follows African-
American masculinity, history, culture, and identity.60 That Louisiana 
resident fans logically linked it to yet another hometown football team61 
 
 55 Associated Press, NFL Claims Trademark Infringement, ESPN (Jan. 30, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs/2009/news/story?id=4871697 [https://perma.cc/X44K-DQPV]. 
(threatening production of “who dat say we can’t print who dat?” tee shirts in an open letter to NFL 
commissioner Roger Goodell from Senator David Vitter). 
 56 Jennifer Levitz, Who Owns ‘Who Dat’? Dats Us Sez da NFL, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2010, 12:01 
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703389004575033504283711006 
[https://perma.cc/2AXK-S4FC]. 
 57 Associated Press, NFL Claims Trademark Infringement, ESPN (Jan. 30, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs/2009/news/story?id=4871697 [https://perma.cc/X44K-DQPV]. 
(“Please either drop your present ridiculous position or sue me.”). 
 58 Jennifer Levitz, Who Owns ‘Who Dat’? Dats Us Sez da NFL, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2010, 12:01 
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703389004575033504283711006 
[https://perma.cc/2AXK-S4FC] (illustrating the cultural significance of the phrase; “The NFL, they 
contend, never cared about the quirky chant when the football team was dubbed the ‘Aints a few decades 
ago, or after it was ousted from its home stadium in 2005 by Hurricane Katrina and finished 3-13.”). 
 59 Id. (providing evidence for the overwhelming roots of the phrase to locals includes a reference to 
“a woman who said her dog is named ‘Who Dat’”). 
 60 Kathleen Flynn, Saints Call ‘Who Dat’ Black-and-Gold Casket a Trademark Violation, NOLA 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2014/02/nfl_says_who_dat_casket_a_
trad.html [https://perma.cc/K2FQ-GVEL] (showing that even in 2014 clashes continued, here against a 
local casket builder using ‘who dat’ and related iconography, an extreme which begs the question of if 
purchasers could conceivably be confused as to the NFL as a source or quality control over their final 
resting place, as opposed to broader cultural messaging). 
 61 Davidson, supra note 52 (referring to earlier use by two local high schools). 
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through music62 in the 1980s should not be interpreted as forfeiting “who 
dat” to NFL commissioner Roger Goodell or anyone else’s control. The 
questions raised by the “who dat” controversy remain largely unanswered 
due to settlements and prohibitive court costs.63 
Another historically rich example is “Derby Pie.”64 To most, bourbon, 
pecans, and chocolate alongside Kentucky Derby iconography, characterize 
the traditional dessert. A different recipe, sans bourbon and pecans with the 
attached moniker of Kern’s Kitchen, is sold by “Derby Pie” mark holders. 
Since 1968, the Derby Pie “owners” have rigorously defended it in court.65 
In 1988, Bon Appetit magazine won a summary judgment motion66 on a 
genericism suit by presenting magazines, cookbooks, and menus from across 
the country, all containing different recipes of the pie and all independent of 
Kern’s, only to have it overturned as insufficient evidence on appeal and 
settled out of court.67 
Ralph Lauren, an American clothing brand, offers several instances of 
capitalization on pre-existing mark meaning. Associations of polo, a sport of 
horseback riding and mallets, with the cultural upper crust of society dates 
back to first century Persian kings68—or, alternatively, in Ralph Lauren’s 
view to a distinctly American lifestyle brand in 1967.69 Polo Ralph Lauren, 
a subset of the clothing company, brought a suit against Polo Magazine, a 
periodical backed by the sport’s governing body the United States Polo 
Association (USPA),70 when the magazine attempted to expand from a 
sports-only publication to the lifestyle associated with it. Given the 
 
 62 Dbg53, supra note 53. 
 63 For more on the structural troubles of outside parties attempting to rein in marks, see infra Section 
IV. A. Anti-Competitive Incentives. 
 64 Nina Feldman, What’s Inside a ‘Derby Pie’? Maybe a Lawsuit Waiting to Happen, NPR THE SALT 
(May 1, 2015, 9:39 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/05/01/399842082/whats-inside-a-
derby-pie-maybe-a-lawsuit-waiting-to-happen [https://perma.cc/3N8N-BUSX]. 
 65 Brett Barrouquere, Derby Pie maker, restaurant end trademark dispute, HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/02/a-pie-by-any-other-name-_n_4030728.html [https://perma.cc/
9BD4-NE9T] (Last updated: October 2, 2013, 12:59 PM). The Claudia Sanders Dinner House was on the 
receiving end of one particular suit, based only on how diners and servers would refer to the pie, despite 
official menus granting it another uncontested name. Id. 
 66 Kern’s Kitchen, Inc. v. Bon Appetit, 669 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (providing evidence of 
generic uses including “some 20 restaurants, stores and shops in 8 states” as well as “132 cookbooks, 23 
newspapers and 10 magazine articles”). 
 67 Kern’s Kitchen, Inc. v. Bon Appetit, 850 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1988) (indicating that a lack of 
consumer surveys is “not necessarily fatal to defendant’s argument at trial” but rules it insufficient to rely 
on “anecdotal” evidence). 
 68 See Richard C. Latham, Polo, BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/sports/polo 
[https://perma.cc/2Y99-T79L]. 
 69 Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 70 Id. 
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prominence of Polo Ralph Lauren and connotations of high-class athletics it 
had adopted, courts found the magazine’s expansion created a risk of 
confusing the public. The court also addressed the case’s irony: “PRL [Polo 
Ralph Lauren] products became famous by basking in the reflected glow of 
an elegant sport. PRL now asserts that it, not the sport, is the source of the 
glow. . . . In a sense, PRL is biting the hand that fed it.”71 However, the court 
treated the magazine as a combination of artistic and commercial expression, 
and remanded the case to establish less burdensome relief, such as 
disclaimers, to prevent possible confusion.72 Purely commercial speech from 
the same source, though, may have been silenced. 
Ralph Lauren did not confine its glow-basking to one sport. Rugby rose 
to popularity in 1850s Britain or, in mark form, from a 2004 Ralph Lauren 
brand extension. Here, not only were the atmospheric connotations of the 
sport seized, but so too was the term itself.73 The use of “rugby” by anyone 
other than Ralph Lauren when printed on clothing, or even alongside other 
words, was met with cease-and-desist letters from PRL. Again, a suit was 
filed against organizers of the actual sport being described, a body called 
Rugby America. Unlike the Polo suit, Rugby had never intruded into the 
“lifestyle” commerce Ralph Lauren often stakes—it simply used the word in 
its description of the Rugby America organization printed on clothing. 
Rugby America succeeded, but only by a legal technicality which persuaded 
Ralph Lauren to back down.74 In the Polo trial, USPA lawyers attempted to 
establish Ralph Lauren’s pattern of claiming a very broad scope of marks by 
noting the company’s disregard for the sport of rugby before the second suit 
was even filed.75 While groups from both sports ultimately retained 
reasonable ability to use the words, neither result set a precedent for 
protecting the logical mark users from this type of costly legal action. In 
addition to the structural impediments to preventing a privatization of these 
 
 71 Id. at 673. 
 72 Id. at 675 (noting, “The appropriate remedy may be may be ‘not less speech, but more.’”). 
 73 Alex Goff, Perseverance Sees Rugby Company Win Legal Battle with Polo Ralph Lauren, RUGBY 
TODAY (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.rugbytoday.com/rugby-news-around-america/perseverance-sees-
rugby-company-win-legal-battle-polo-ralph-lauren [https://perma.cc/69GK-CU35]. 
 74 Id. (filing a countersuit for fraudulent PTO filings by Ralph Lauren for products Ralph Lauren 
lacked intent to produce is what Rugby America representatives claim led to the suit being dropped with 
prejudice). 
 75 U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). An odd 
parallel stands out when comparing the fact that Ralph Lauren had a chain of stores named “Rugby,” with 
Lauren having no significant ties to or even apparent interest in the sport, Rugby, while he long had a 
beloved dog with that very name, Rugby. Compare this to another dog name “Who Dat,” which was taken 
as evidence of public interest in a mark. See Levitz, supra note 58. In contrast, Lauren’s naming of his 
dog could be evidence that the term’s public connotations were meaningless to Lauren. Buzz McClain, 
Ralph Lauren vs Rugby?, RUGBY MAGAZINE (Apr. 15, 2006). 
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culturally-created mark-meanings, the aforementioned examples also 
illustrate the problem of attribution of such value. 
D. Free Riders 
As protection of a producer’s goodwill has been elevated to a primary 
justification for trademark rights, producers have been allowed to expand 
their spheres of control. When mark holders balk that infringers “reap what 
they have not sown,”76 they are asserting exclusive ownership of whatever 
value there is to be reaped. In dilution cases, the mark holder’s investment 
in a mark is quantified using metrics such as advertising spending.77 
With the rise of “intent to use” applications, mark holders can begin to 
stake their claims without evidence of any actual use,78 much less evidence 
that the mark’s appeal to consumers should be contributed to the registrant. 
If common interpretations of the mark’s meaning are to be considered at all 
beyond assessing distinctiveness, pre-existing appeal is assumed to 
evaporate the moment the mark is registered. The impressions a mark gives 
to what the law would deem a typical consumer are distilled from a 
compilation of assumptions, almost all of which are put forth by parties 
vested in commercial potential.79 This is well-expressed by Graeme W. 
Austin: 
There is of course an important normative preference for one set of consumers 
over others that is close to the surface of these neutrally-expressed 
“presumptions.” As a result, the ordinarily prudent consumer gets constructed 
as somebody who is concerned with whether goods are officially sponsored, 
and not as somebody who values the brand for its affiliative symbolism alone. 
It is not prudent, apparently, for consumers to want promotional goods simply 
for their own sake, and possibly to pay cheaper prices, with little concern with 
the actual origin of the goods.80 
 
 76 See Dreyfuss, supra note 46. 
 77 See Nat’l. Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479, (T.T.A.B. 
2010). 
 78 Frank Z. Hellwig, The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988: The 100th Congress Leaves Its Mark, 
79 TRADEMARK REP. 287, 291–292 (1989). The statute only requires a bona fide intent to use the mark, 
not actual proof of use. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1128 (1988). 
 79 Challenges and criticism of the inconsistencies in and inadequate methodology of measuring 
consumer sentiment are included infra, Sections III. B. Of the Consumer, and IV. C. Creation of 
Commercial Association. Almost without exception, tests lack a “negative” approach that would attempt 
to measure consumer sentiment which could lead to an outcome without financial beneficiaries. This 
follows logically from the costly nature of consumer research, and the incentives and lack thereof in the 
current trademark system. 
 80 Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 901 
(2004). 
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There are many conceivable interests of the consumer that have been 
left behind in trademark law. Self-expression, either freedom to use 
trademarks as cultural artifacts81 or in preserving existing cultural artifacts 
from being converted into marks,82 are two such valuable interests when 
considering marks with pre-existing value. 
A deeper problem emerges when skewed value-attribution is overlaid 
with the loosening of requirements to register a trademark. The allowance of 
intent to use in mark registrations, by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 
1988,83 created mark approval without any proof of any investment, requiring 
only a sworn statement of the applicant’s intent to use and good faith, which 
goes unscrutinized. This establishes a date of mark ownership if proof of 
commercial use is provided within a timeframe of up to 36 months. Once 
this is granted, a high assumption of mark validity is given. Removing the 
need to prove commercial use without commensurately reducing the 
assumptive power of the mark’s registration has thrown the trademark 
system off-balance.84 
Certainly intellectual property free-riding extends beyond the 
trademark domain. A window for opportunistic85 behavior is not isolated to 
trademark law; “patent trolls” abusing ambiguous bad-faith patents have 
become a newsworthy subject rampant in the technology sector and which 
have been investigated by Congress.86 Domain squatting, or “cyber-piracy,”87 
has been defeated by famed businesses in court.88 Similarly, “celebrity 
squatting” often delves into remedies through a right to publicity,89 but 
illustrates this issue of culture and technology blurring the standards for 
attribution. One does not have to be invoking a name to infringe on rights to 
publicity, with the seminal case protecting a celebrity’s rights through a 
 
 81 See Dreyfuss, supra note 46. 
 82 Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural 
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533, 1569 (1993). 
 83 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1128 (1988); Hellwig, supra note 78, at 291–292. 
 84 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §19.08[1][a] (3d ed. 1995); 
United States Trademark Association, Trademark Review Commission, Report and Recommendation to 
USTA Present and Board Members, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 392–393 (1987). 
 85 Lee B. Burgunder, Opportunistic Trademarking of Slogans: It’s No Clown Issue, Bro, 31 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 769 (2013). 
 86 Econostats at George Mason University, Who Are Patent Trolls and What Will We Do about 
Them?, FORBES (May 29, 2015, 4:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/econostats/2015/05/29/who-are-
patent-trolls-and-what-will-h-r-9-do-about-them/ [https://perma.cc/92AL-RP8Q]. 
 87 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
 88 Nike, Inc. v. Circle Group Internet, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). 
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prominent catchphrase,90 and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) 
precedent coming to respect commercial linkage91 as well as the mark’s 
being “almost a nickname.”92 
Even modern “fame” does not easily lead to clear attributions of 
investment in creating mark value. As technology and mass media have 
borne the concept of ‘going viral’ almost instantaneously, it becomes harder 
to trace the rise of a mark’s notoriety. One jarring example is the case of 
“Let’s roll,”93 a colloquialism that became imbued with new communal and 
individual meanings within hours of being uttered by a passenger on a 
crashing plane during the September 11th attacks. The term rapidly gained a 
massive well-known set of associations attached to it. Though it became 
endowed with powerful meaning, this was clearly not the sort of 
informational function trademark law intended to protect, as no producer 
reputation was conveyed though circumstances established intrinsic 
goodwill.94 There are no advertising expenditures any particular party can 
point to as its investment in creating the mark. Nevertheless, an unrelated 
individual was able to take ownership over the phrase through trademark, 
without any questions asked.95 
Another historic event, the Brexit (British exit) from the European 
Union (EU), has been the subject of trademark petitions. The makers of 
Samuel Adams Boston Lager filed an application to trademark the term with 
intent to use for hard cider on June 24, 2016, the day of the referendum’s 
announced results favoring the United Kingdom’s leaving the EU.96 The pro-
Brexit vote was so momentous that it resulted in British Prime Minister 
David Cameron’s resignation and in the British pound’s value dropping to a 
three-decade low for that national currency. Google Trends show that in 
comparison to searches that day for the term “Brexit,” searches for this 
 
 90 See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (showing how at 
this point in trademark law, it was important that this phrase included Johnny’s name, had a two-decade 
consistency in the public eye, and was repeated nightly on broadcast television). 
 91 Robert D. Litowitz & Mark Traphagen, The Song Remains the Same, 18 TEX. PARALEGAL J. 
(2000), https://txpd.org/tpj/18/song_same.htm [https://perma.cc/396A-ZKM3]. 
 92 Id. (“affidavits of several members of the music industry stating that ‘Margaritaville’ was almost 
a nickname of Jimmy Buffet”). 
 93 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76316210 (filed Sept. 22, 2001); See also Noah Bleicher, 
Trademarking Tragedy: The Fight for Exclusive Rights to ‘Let’s Roll’, 52 EMORY L.J. 1847 (2003). 
 94 Bleicher, supra note 93, at 1865. 
 95 Bleicher, supra note 93, at 1874–75. 
 96 Jacob Gershman, Sam Adams Brewer Seeks to Trademark ‘Brexit,’ WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2016 
11:55 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/06/29/sam-adams-brewer-seeks-to-trademark-brexit/ 
[https://perma.cc/PZ6P-EP4W]. 
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brewer, and even “beer” itself, occurred with frequencies of zero and four 
percent, respectively.97 
Under these circumstances, it seems that mark holders are the ones “free 
riding” or “reaping where they have not sown.” If efforts are to be made to 
better articulate the value a mark does (or does not) contain in commerce, 
then its primary functions must be examined in several dimensions. 
III.PRIMARY PURPOSE 
In the light of protecting information transmission and consumer 
interests,98 understanding the potentially multidimensional purposes of a 
mark is critical. The reality that a mark interacts with and affects the product 
at hand, and the normative choice to deny mark-based non-reputational 
advantages to one competitor, are reflected by the doctrine of functionality, 
including aesthetic functionality. Marks may be valuable for their own 
communicative strength. Some desirable non-source messages—including, 
without any controversy, plain product-description and the extension thereto 
to personal expression by consumers—are not meant for commoditization 
via trademark. Investigating the perception of consumers at the point of 
purchase, as well as the primary appeal or use the product serves for them, 
facilitates the most realistic grasp on a possible mark’s nature. 
A. Of the Mark 
The functionality doctrine restricts trademarks on aspects of the product 
which are “essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost 
or quality of the article.”99 This delineates the boundary from patent law, 
which is meant to reward functional advances and inventions. It also protects 
meaningful competition for the benefit of the market. Features have been 
defined as functional if restricting them would cause “significant, non-
reputational disadvantages” to competitors.100 Essential product functions 
may be classified in a variety of ways; thus, we will borrow from literature 
segmenting functions of utile, aesthetic, and commutative purposes. 101 
 
 97 GOOGLE TRENDS, https://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=brexit%2C%20%2Fm%
2F05hm41r%2C%20%2Fm%2F01599&date=today%201-m&cmpt=q&tz=Etc%2FGMT%2B4 (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/VBP6-QNGW]. 
 98 See supra Section I. A. Justifications. 
 99 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850–51 n.10 (1982). 
 100 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995). 
 101 Vincent N. Palladino, Trade Dress Functionality After TrafFix: The Lower Courts Divide Again, 
93 TRADEMARK REP. 1219, 1224–25 (2003). 
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Utile functions are features directly contributing to the product purpose 
as intended by the producer.102 However, intended function is not necessarily 
espoused in good faith on all trademark registrations. This can be illustrated 
by the controversy surrounding Boise State University’s trademark on its 
abnormal blue-turf football field.103 Its trademark registration details an 
entertainment purpose, through intercollegiate sports played in the stadium 
and shown through media.104 First, it could and has been argued that a 
colorful field qualitatively affects those purposes. Telegenic benefits are 
touted by owners of similarly vibrant sports fields105 and are a prized factor 
for media broadcasters.106 Complaints of competitive advantage in those 
intercollegiate sports, by way of camouflage, emerged when Boise’s football 
team adopted turf-matching blue uniforms.107 The scientific merits of this 
asserted advantage has not been studied, but complaints appear to be 
bolstered by the football team’s uncharacteristically strong home win record 
correlating with the use of such uniforms.108 Additionally, any source-
identifying purpose is dubious in context. The turf is physically fixed within 
the campus grounds, surrounded by Boise State signage, and during game 
broadcasts, students and fans.109 In broadcasts, primarily of college football 
games, the scoreboard, uniforms, traditional field markings, and presentation 
by announcers all clearly identify the host team.110 These potential 
advantages for Boise State, even only in its stated purposes of sporting events 
and of securing lucrative broadcasts, outweigh whatever incremental, 
source-identifying objective is available. 
 
 102 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 103 For a comprehensive examination, see Michelle Gallagher, Who Owns Blue? An Examination of 
the Functionality Doctrine in University Sports Color, 104 TRADEMARK REP. 765 (2014). 
 104 BLUE TURF, Registration No. 3,707,623. 
 105 Clare Lochary, For Field Hockey, a New, Blue View, N.Y. TIMES (Jul 6, 2012, 8:48 AM), 
http://london2012.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/for-field-hockey-a-new-blue-view/ 
[https://perma.cc/9UFB-KFFY]. 
 106 Sportvision, Inc. v. Sportsmedia Tech. Corp., WL 408634, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal Feb. 17, 2006). 
 107 See Gallagher, supra note 103. 
 108 Boise State’s home record from 1980 until field implementation was 28-10 (73.7%) with an away 
record of 19-13 (59.4%). The colored field was implemented at the beginning of the 1986 season, when 
Boise State went 4-2 at home and 1-5 away. From the field’s implementation through October 24, 2015 
Boise State went 166-33 (83.4%) at home and 104-75 (58%) away. Since the 1999 season, the team has 
only lost 4 out of 104 home games, the best home field record in all of college football by win percentage. 
Even then, three of those losses came with Boise State wore non-blue uniforms. While traditional “home 
field advantage” can explain some of the discrepancy, it is at least a remarkable pattern. Statistics from 
cfbdatawarehouse.com. 
 109 See Sam Fortier, Boise State Mounts a Paper Defense of Its Home Turf, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/boise-state-mounts-a-paper-defense-of-
its-home-turf.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4ME9-J62A]. 
 110 Id. 
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Aesthetic functionality111 is described in the Pagliero case as 
ornamentation serving “an important ingredient in the commercial success.” 
112 The court determined that consumers interpreted a decorative pattern on 
china as a desirable quality in and of itself, and not primarily as a source 
indicator: “the design sells the china.”113 There are two significant 
implications of this doctrine, which established that when a design performs 
a function more so than identifies a source, it should not receive protection 
under trademark law. The first is a priority for consumer interests. No matter 
the legitimacy of efforts undertaken by the mark holder, purchaser 
perceptions are of greater concern. The second is the judiciary’s realistic 
conception of this purchasing public. The perfectly rational, as in utilitarian, 
consumer is a myth.114 Even if rationality were possible, to consumers, 
aesthetics are a valid function, 115 and if that value is significant enough, then 
it is not meant to be swept up into trademark protection. To discuss 
ingredients in commercial success acknowledges a multitude of forces at 
work in decision-making. Aesthetic functionality is respected when 
consumer interests are evaluated realistically and comprehensively. 
Communicative function is the category most often ignored and 
threatened by modern trademark practices, as much legal scholarship has 
discussed.116 Many “communications” touch upon the desires of consumers 
versus producers, but others are purely informative statements117 that a 
layman might assume belong in a “public domain.” For instance, a 32-year-
old man was granted several trademarks in the mid-1990s for the standard 
 
 111 Margot E. Parmenter, Louboutins and Legal Loopholes: Aesthetic Functionality and Fashion, 40 
PEPP. L. REV. 4 (2013). 
 112 Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952). 
 113 Id. at 343–44. 
 114 Devin R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 1029 (2012) (“Mired in the 
world of the fully rational consumer, trademark law claims that trademarks are information resources for 
the consumer to use as part of the purchasing process. Whether this rational creature exists is questionable, 
and empirical work to support the view is missing.”). 
 115 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) (“[S]atisfy the noble instinct for 
giving the right touch of beauty to common and necessary things.”) (quoting G. Chesterton, Simplicity 
and Tolstoy 61 (1912)). 
 116 See, e.g., Joseph P. Lui, Sports Merchandising, Publicity Rights, and the Missing Role of the 
Sports Fan, 11 B.C. L. REV. 421, 448 (2011); Stephanie Frank, Showing Your School Spirit: Why 
University Color Schemes and Indicia Do Not Deserve Trademark Protection, 92 B.U. L. REV. 329, 364 
(2012); Gerald T. Tschura, Likelihood of Confusion and Expressive Functionality: A Fresh Look at the 
Ornamental Use of Institutional Colors, Names and Emblems on Apparel and Other Goods, 53 WAYNE 
L. REV. 873, 884–87 (2007). 
 117 In re Volvo Cars of North America Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1455 (TTAB 1998) (rejecting “drive 
safely”). 
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character mark, “Class of 2000,”118 for a range of product categories from tee 
shirts to teddy bears. When this story hit the news about 16 months before 
that academic “class” would generally graduate, he already had over 30 
licensees who had each agreed to 8 to 10 percent royalty fees to use the 
term.119 Where copyright law prohibits registering non-original facts or 
phrases, trademark law does not.120 Instead of carrying information about 
source or even qualities associated with source, communicative marks may 
themselves constitute the information itself. No consistent litmus test is 
applied to determine the mark’s primary meaning or possibly protected 
functions before granting functionally powerful trademark rights. 
B. Of the Consumer 
The consumer’s motivations in purchase decisions are also evaluated 
and ranked in trademark disputes. Consumers may be simply utilitarian and 
rely only on a product’s reputation, or they may be swayed by emotion and 
beauty. There are many psychological needs that brands can fulfill to attract 
consumers by way of trademarks.121 Goods may serve as “billboards,” 
communicative tools in the hands of consumers to express themselves.122 
 
 118 Associated Press, ‘Class of 2000’ Trademarked for Merchandise in Retailers, TOLEDO BLADE, 
Oct. 7, 1998, https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=Yg8wAAAAIBAJ&sjid=6gMEAAAAIBAJ&
pg=3896%2C2418085 [https://perma.cc/3PPS-25PZ]. 
 119 The judiciary, of course, is not blind or indifferent to the stark clashes of common sense with 
statute. This is one such mark that would likely be struck down by any court which seriously evaluated 
consumer interpretation or the content of the mark. However, a combination of “the tragedy of the 
commons” and “the path of least resistance” allows marks in the style of “Class of 2000” to exist 
profitably. Users who believe they have a clear legal right to these words would also simultaneously 
believe that the mark holder’s legal threats would be unsuccessful, and would rationally believe this mark 
is invalid. That belief can be pursued by an expensive legal case petitioning for generification, opening 
up the mark to all users by the efforts and expenditures of one. Alternatively, it may be pursued simply 
ignoring legal threats and continuing about one’s business, at no cost. If the mark holder truly believes in 
the mark’s legitimacy, then he or she may move forward with threats and the court will rule, putting this 
legitimacy at the risk of the court’s evaluation. However, as long as the mark holder does not carry through 
with legal action against “infringers,” there is hardly any risk of cancellation. Merely notifying users of 
the mark registration allows for the possibility of licensing payments from those who take the threat 
seriously, or are risk-adverse. If a mark holder did not believe its registration’s ability to hold up in court, 
this could be quite a profitable alternative to problematic litigation. In this particular case, the mark holder 
was bold enough to publicize his opportunistic tactics and lack of intent to pursue them, supra note 118. 
This particular mark holder’s behavior could be addressed by more robust importation estoppel, described 
infra Section V. B. Eye on the Ball. 
 120 See the idea-expression dichotomy, supra Section I. B. Uniqueness among Intellectual Property. 
 121 WILLIAM J. MCEWEN, MARRIED TO THE BRAND: WHY CONSUMERS BOND WITH SOME BRANDS 
FOR LIFE 32–33 (2005) (detailing five distinct ways brands may carry personal meaning: prestige, 
representing personal qualities, membership, memory triggers, and self-completion). 
 122 For a thorough and very fun study of billboard products and slogan trademarking, see Burgunder, 
supra note 85. 
15:149 (2018) Mutating Marks: Refusing to Lose the Trademark Trail 
169 
Certainly, there is a limit to how much a consumer’s desire for 
expressive use should be valued through protection from trademarking. Just 
because there is demand for goods that give off the illustrious impression 
that their possessors are, for example, wealthy and stylish enough to own an 
Audi,123 does not grant the right to produce and sell disingenuous key chains. 
In that case, defendants claimed car logos were the “actual benefit” 
consumers desired and thus they were a functional feature. The court 
disagreed, finding the benefit of the logo-indicated company’s goodwill was 
the real motivator for sale.124 The desirability of displaying a well-known car 
logo comes from poaching the connotations the mark holder built into it. It 
is not merely the design of an Audi symbol, but the inferred luxury and 
financial standing it carries because of the association to high-status cars. It 
is also important to note that key chains marked with a car logo are 
reasonably related product categories, where this implied association is clear. 
But when the actual benefit of a mark is its implication, it does not 
necessarily mean the mark holder personally created that implication. For 
instance, the Jobs Daughters125 case found on appeal that a fraternal name 
and emblem were functionally aesthetic and not serving as marks. The court 
cited a lack of evidence that consumers would interpret the mark as source-
identifying. Consumers were, in fact, purchasing bracelets displaying this 
emblem for the symbol’s own value. If the Au-tomotive use was unacceptable 
because the owner’s meaning was misappropriated by third parties for 
ornamental use, there should be reciprocal consideration when pre-existing 
meanings are being mined by the original mark holders.126 
There are numerous other trademark cases in relation to the insignia of 
fraternal or “Greek” organizations for parallel consideration. The district 
court in Pure Country127 rejected outright the Jobs Daughter’s logic 
regarding aesthetic functionality, but left other logical gaps in protecting 
marks used for personal expression. Charges against mark holders for 
abandonment through naked licensing128 were rejected by the court “because 
the consumers are the members of the trademark-holding organizations. . . . 
There is no issue of consumer deceit.”129 However, there is some circular 
 
 123 Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 126 This is arguably the case in circumstances such as those mentioned supra, D. Free Riders. 
 127 Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc. v. Pure Country, Inc., No. IP 01-1054-C-B/F, 2004 WL 
3391781 at *6 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 26, 2004). 
 128 See supra, Section II. A. Changing Nature. 
 129 Pure Country, 2004 WL 3391781 at 11. However, because the defendant here was a lapsed former 
licensee, estoppel established their recognition of the mark’s owners, as well as sacrificed potential 
arguments for a lack of confusion to those same buyers. Id. 
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logic at work. Firstly, this dismisses evidence of broad, uncontrolled mark 
use as irrelevant, because consumers have pre-existing relationship with the 
mark. Intentional interaction with unsanctioned uses could in fact reveal that 
the “relationships” are either not with or irrelevant of the trademark in its 
intended sense. Instead, lapses in mark holder control are deemed harmless, 
in service of an interpretation that tamps out a similar uncontrolled use for 
causing harm. This is one of many illustrations of consumer competence 
being determined inconsistently, at the will of mark holder interests. In 
relation to the lack of source-information conveyed by a mark, one opinion 
stated: 
[D]efendants’ contention that UNC-CH’s marks have lost significance as 
indication of origin because the public can no longer point to a single source of 
the origin of goods bearing the marks does not establish abandonment, for 
under Sweetheart130 abandonment occurs only when a mark loses all 
significance as an indication of origin as to the mark itself.131 
This is an underwhelming standard when combined with the negligible 
state of “quality control” standards required to avoid a finding that a mark 
has been “abandoned”.132 What instead may be protected is language and 
symbolism captured by a mark, without meaningful limitations on where it 
came from. 
C. Of the Purchase 
Aside from considering what function consumers may intend a mark to 
have, it also must be analyzed according to what purpose the mark-bearing 
goods themselves serve. Take, for example, the retail of licensed collegiate 
apparel. There, some courts have utilized the functionality test of equally-
effective alternatives133 in establishing whether or not a university had the 
exclusive right to products bearing its name: 
We do not believe that anyone could seriously argue that the soft goods at issue 
here are, in any realistic way, in competition with similar, unadorned soft goods. 
The relevant product market for the consumer in this case is soft goods which 
allow the consumer to show his or her allegiance to Pitt. . . . Because the Pitt 
insignia on soft goods serve a functional purpose and largely define a sub 
market [sic] of some size, granting Pitt the relief it seeks would give Pitt a 
perpetual monopoly over that sub market, precluding any competition in the Pitt 
 
 130 Referencing Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Detroit Forming, Inc., 743 F.2d 1039 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 131 Bd. of Gov. of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (emphasis 
in original). 
 132 See infra Section IV.B.2. Diminishing Expectations of Control. 
 133 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32–34 (2001). 
15:149 (2018) Mutating Marks: Refusing to Lose the Trademark Trail 
171 
insignia soft goods market. We know of no legal theory which would 
countenance such a result.134 
Compare that reasoning to a Texas court’s rudimentary analysis of 
functionality, holding that “[t]he fact that a knit cap is scarlet and black or 
bears a ‘Double T’ does not affect the quality of the cap or its ability to keep 
one’s head warm.”135 As such there was “no evidence that the use of the 
Texas Tech color scheme could affect the cost or quality of the products or 
are the reason the products work.”136 Yet Collegiate Licensing Company 
(CLC), which now represents both of these aforementioned schools in 
licensing matters, itself values the collegiate merchandise retail market at 
$4.6 billion.137 Just as Pitt found, it is not mere chance or a collegiate-affinity 
for superior clothing and knick-knack production which creates this robust 
market, with branded products that are on equal footing as any unadorned 
knit cap. 
The market for collegiate apparel is a distinct one. The CLC also offers 
some arguments for marks’ effects upon cost, quality, and product function 
in their own company promotional materials, stating that “colleges and 
universities have some of the most loyal and passionate fans in the world. 
They love to show their team spirit on their shirts, on their cars, at the game, 
and in their home.”138 If fans’ desire to show their passionate spirit is indeed 
“the reason the products work,” should they only be able to do so through 
licensed goods?139 In a choice between relevant market definitions, the Pitt 
approach, extending established functionality standards to capture retail 
realities, is far more in line with confining trademarks to their intended 
purpose. 
 
 134 Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 722 (W.D. Pa. 1983). 
 135 Tex. Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 527 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2006). 
 136 As the court found the red-and-black color scheme to have secondary meaning, which required 
probing into perception, this statement is not a result of naivety. It is an instance of willingness to 
alternately invoke and ignore consumer sentiment to the end result of avoiding consumer protection. For 
discussion of the wealth of branding literature acknowledging mark power and influence over product 
purpose and cost, see Desai, supra note 114. 
 137 About CLC, COLLEGIATE LICENSING COMPANY, https://www.clc.com/About-CLC.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/G3KC-NGBL] (last visited Feb. 28, 2017). 
 138 Id. 
 139 See John J. Voortman, Trademark Licensing of Names, Insignia, Characters and Designs: The 
Current Status of the Boston Pro Hockey Per Se Infringement Rule, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 567, 575 
(1989) (arguing that making exclusive the right to sell these desirable goods creates property 
“fundamentally different from traditional trademark rights”); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 964 (1993) (suggesting four criteria for analyzing commoditized marks upon, “moral 
claims, utilitarian considerations, the potential for negative goodwill flowing from unlicensed uses, and 
society’s interest in free and open communication”). 
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Damn I’m Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc.140 is another case where an 
aesthetic functional feature was found to be instrumental to the goods’ 
purpose. “Damn I’m Good” was among several cheeky phrases printed on 
gold bangles. The fact that the bracelets were not offered un-inscribed 
contributed to the court finding that the phrase was the fundamental product 
being sold, hence not a valid trademark.141 Thus, the purchase is driven by 
the tagline, making the mark itself a commodity, instead of the underlying 
bracelet. If that is the case, a sizable market may be swept up in a single 
mark, adorning a variety of vessels. 
One cannot expect uniformity on a relatively subjective matter. The 
TTAB and judiciary cannot sidestep product and attribute appraisal when 
evaluating marks. Words, symbols, and colors have meaning independent of 
commercial attribution. For example, floral arrangements in black vases are 
commonly used for Halloween, bereavement, or the color’s luxurious 
appeal.142 
D. Scale of Specificity  
To normalize these discussions, what must be agreed upon is at what 
scale of detail the consumer purchase decision determinations should be 
analyzed. A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman143 was generous in the level of 
detail granted to analysis of consumer preference. Although the company 
was known by consumers at the time as the sole source of diet chocolate 
fudge flavored soda in the market, this was ruled to be a generic term 
describing the product.144 Beverages are not interchangeable; and even soda 
flavors are not freely substituted. There were even clashes pertaining to the 
distinctiveness of “chocolate” versus “fudge” as descriptors.145 
However, the term “honey baked ham” was found to be an acceptable 
mark.146 Calling back the genus analogy for determining genericism (where 
a product lies within a category, as a species lies within a genus),147 the court 
found honey prepared ham to be the category within which “honey baked” 
 
 140 514 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 141 Id. at 1360. 
 142 In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc., Serial No. 77590475 (TTAB Mar. 28, 2013). 
 143 A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 144 Id. at 298. 
 145 Jeffrey A. Leib, In Soda Rivalry, Chocolate Is In, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 1985), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/04/garden/in-soda-rivalry-chocolate-is-in.html [https://perma.cc/
8THZ-22KH]. 
 146 Schmidt v. Quigg, 609 F. Supp. 227, 231 (E.D. Mich. 1985). 
 147 Pierce, supra note 25; H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 
989-90 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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resided.148 These differences seem small, but at least have sound logical 
backing. “Honey baking” could result in the same product as honey 
preparing, smothering, infusing, or any of several other compound verbs, but 
“diet chocolate fudge soda” invokes only a flavor, leaving no breathing room 
for interpretation, and thus for competition. 
Ring pops149 illustrate the complexity of genus determination, where 
courts have endeavored to undertake it. According to the court, the genus 
was lollipop candy.150 However, whether the relevant consumer class is 
interpreted to be the children or the parents they are pressuring for the 
candy,151 both can likely distinguish between the distinct types of lollipop 
proffered under the trademarks Blow Pop, Tootsie Pop, Ring Pop, Push Pop, 
Baby Bottle Pop, or Dum Dum. The ring shape was deemed a “search 
attribute” that children were after, but not of primary importance to the 
function.152 There can be many other levels of specificity available for 
determining genus. For instance, the particular ring shape could have been a 
defensible categorical division, as could “lollipop that functions as a toy,” 
“wearable lollipop,” or “lollipop in ring shape.” These descriptions are 
presented in descending level of detail, and choosing between these levels 
should be guided by the considerations of relevant consumers.153 Will a Dum 
Dum equally placate a child demanding candy accessories? Would any youth 
be concerned with the exact jewel shape being replicated? Consumer 
research heralds the effectiveness of market differentiation in creating 
consumer demand, while trademark jurisprudence often naïvely ignores this 
fragmentation’s consequences.154 
 
 148 Schmidt, 609 F. Supp. at 229. 
 149 Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., No. 96 CIV. 7302 (RWS), 1996 WL 719381, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 13, 1996). 
 150 See id. at 2–3. 
 151 The Nag Factor: Children and Unhealthy Foods, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.jhsph.edu/news/news-releases/2011/borzekowski-nag-
factor.html [https://perma.cc/YC3T-B68V]. 
 152 Topps Co., 1996 WL 719381. 
 153 As the level of investment in consumption choices are considered in the multi-factor test for 
infringement, it is necessary to examine how courts define “relevant consumer” for a given product. If 
children are the relevant consumers here, not only is their investment in candy likely much greater than 
that of their parents, but the possibility for a mark-conferred competitive advantage is much stronger. 
Shifting conceptions of consumers are discussed supra Section III. B. Of the Consumer. Here it is worth 
noting that a candy is likely to be campaigned for by children, and the (presumably high) impact frivolous 
attributes have on them specifically should affect the weight of competitive protections given to such 
attributes as marks. See Julia Riehm McGuffey, The New Edition of New Edition: Boybands, Trademarks, 
and Shifting Goodwill, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 167 (2008) (for an instance of functionalism based on 
individual circumstances); see also Pierce, supra note 25. 
 154 See Desai, supra note 114, at 992. 
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The breadth of genus determination can be, and has been, equated to 
market definition. 155 Given that both the functionality and aesthetic 
functionality doctrines discuss preventing unfair disadvantages among 
competitors, logically those competitors must be identified. Similar cases, 
University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc.156 and Texas Tech 
University v. Spiegelberg,157 still vary greatly in their standards for defining 
and interpreting the competitive market, which vary across time and 
jurisdictions. However, there is no identifiable trend moving toward a more 
realistic assessment of actual market conditions. 
IV.HOW TRADEMARK TURNED ON ITSELF 
As the business and legal concepts associated with intellectual property 
have grown in importance and complexity, some developments in the law 
and practice of trademark appear inordinate if not outright byzantine.158 The 
law is due for not a complete reset, but reform. Without some significant 
change, a formalistic legal climate for branding may run roughshod over 
business creativity and innovation. 
A. Anti-Competitive Incentives 
The trademark for the term “three-peat”159 is a useful study of how 
shifting of trademark law has allowed some marks to become unmoored 
from the intent of serving the market or consumers. National Basketball 
Association (NBA) coach Pat Riley registered this mark160 after allegedly 
overhearing a player use it aspirationally following the Lakers second-in-a-
row NBA Championship in 1989. Naturally, the team had no “three-peat” 
championship to claim at that point, but intent to use had recently been 
incorporated into law,161 and it was perfectly valid to preemptively protect 
 
 155 Anna F. Kingsbury, Market Definition in Intellectual Property Law: Should Intellectual Property 
Courts Use an Antitrust Approach to Market Definition?, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 63, 68–70 
(2004) (proposing the implementation of a consistent standard for market determination as in Antitrust 
law). 
 156 566 F. Supp. 711, 722 (W.D. Pa. 1983). 
 157 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 524 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2006). 
 158 Some commentators fear that a formalistic legal climate preserves unnecessary, counter-
productive codification of trademark law expansion. Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We 
Think: Trademark Defenses in a “Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897 (2009). 
 159 For an in-depth analysis of this particular mark, see Todd D. Kantorczyk, How to Stop the Fast 
Break: An Evaluation of the “Three-Peat” Trademark and the FTC’s Role in Trademark Law 
Enforcement, 2 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 195 (1995) (calling for cancellation; unfortunately, in the intervening 
20 years, the mark has grown stronger, and the applicable law has expanded further). 
 160 Scott Ostler, Champions Entering a New Phrase as Riley Impels by Word of Mouth, L.A. TIMES 
(June 6, 1989), at C1. 
 161 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1128 (1988). 
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actual commercial sales that would follow a possible third win. The term 
came into tension with the spirit of trademark law when the Lakers’ failed to 
win that third championship, yet Riley maintained ownership of the term.162 
“Three-peat” as a mark did not die out with the Lakers’ hopes; three-in-a-
row championships of all types have been won since—even within the NBA, 
by the Chicago Bulls, twice. Riley is said to have collected at least $1 million 
from licensing the term within the NBA alone.163 Eventually the Lakers did 
get a three-peat of championship wins from 2000-2002; however, Riley 
would collect the spoils while coaching the Lakers’ competitor, the Miami 
Heat. Later, coming off back-to-back Heat championship victories in 2014, 
Riley filed for mark extension to bed linens and cell phone cases, before 
failing to cinch the achievement once again. 
Beyond the fact that the mark holder Riley hedges his success by 
profiting off of his team’s competitors (and thus profits from his team’s 
losses), all aspects of this term’s usage fail to meet typical court standards of 
non-genericism.164 The term is commonly used to indicate any three 
consecutive sports championships, often by media, third parties, and publicly 
by Riley himself.165 It is included in dictionaries and an abundance of Internet 
search results with no mark relation. The fact that this mark still legally 
stands, and protections have in fact continued to expand, can be attributed to 
several recent shifts in trademark law. 
The first is the Trademark Improvement Act of 1980,166 which 
eradicated the Patent and Trademark Office’s authority to petition for the 
cancellation of trademarks based on genericism. Effectively, this shifts the 
burden of proving genericism to outside parties who are willing and able to 
petition for cancellation,167 or invest the time and monetary risk of defending 
an infringement suit and attempting to rebut a mark’s high presumption of 
validity.168 Most problematic for private efforts to cancel a mark is the 
lackluster resulting incentives, commonly known as the “tragedy of 
commons.” If a term is determined to be generic, the mark holder does lose 
 
 162 Tony Kornheiser, Anybody Need a 3-Peat Slogan?, L.A. TIMES (June 18, 1989), at C15; see also 
Ostler, supra note 160. 
 163 Doreen Hemlock, Win or Lose, Riley Makes Royalties on ‘Three-Peats,’ SUN SENTINEL (June 9, 
2014), available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2014-06-09/sports/fl-heat-finals-threepeat-pat-riley-
20140608_1_pat-riley-royalties-three-peats [https://perma.cc/MT5F-5STT]. 
 164 See, e.g., Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 892 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 165 Kantorczyk, supra note 159. 
 166 FTC Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980). 
 167 See 15 U.S.C. §1064, also preserving the ability to petition on the grounds of functionality, and 
somewhat mitigating the issue by providing that the FTC may petition for mark cancellation. 
 168 Reese Publ’g Co. v. Hampton Int’l Commc’ns, Inc., 620 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1980) (“If a mark has 
been registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the defendants in an infringement 
action do bear the burden of overcoming the presumption that the mark is not generic.”). 
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exclusive right to control that mark’s use, and the mark is now free for 
everyone to use. However, the complainant alone absorbs the costs of such 
petition, or worse, the costs of defending an infringement action upon such 
grounds. As a practical matter, use of the generic term at hand must be highly 
or uniquely valuable to encourage such a proceeding.169 
Situational matters can compound this lack of incentives.170 First, the 
profitable window of opportunity surrounding, for example, any “three-
peat,” is short lived. Championing the term is useless without a third big win 
on the horizon, and one misses the prime celebratory rush of enthusiasm if 
action is taken too late. These events also are profitable directly in relation 
to their rarity. While the biggest three-peats may touch mainstream pop 
culture and garner national attention, many others may have niche 
commercial appeal. The majority of sports teams have only a regional 
following, and few championships attract the same level of attention as the 
NBA. While this should not render their three-peats irrelevant, or justify Pat 
Riley extracting rents upon their celebratory knick-knacks, it is not a cost-
effective game for the average complainant to play. It is unreasonable that 
obviously valid commercial uses by other sports champions must face 
another challenge: that of an NBA legal team. 
There is no clear path to how “three-peat” would be cancelled,171 so one 
should consider its reality in light of the justifications for trademark rights. 
Certainly no old-fashioned product source information is being relayed. 
Even expanding mark purpose to include “suggestion of affiliation or 
sponsorship” offers lackluster support for Riley’s ownership, considering 
users are entirely different sports or direct competitors. In the latter 
circumstance of in-league three-peats especially, no desirable quality is 
implied by the “mark” of a coach, whose team has, by the mark’s definition, 
been defeated at least thrice. Consumer sentiment is consistently invoked in 
 
 169 Infringement actions always may be defended on the basis of a mark’s genericism, or threats 
economic competition severe enough to infringe antitrust law under Section 33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act. 
After five consecutive years of use, marks become incontestable, eliminating related defenses such as 
asserting a mark to be purely descriptive cannot be raised. Park N’ Fly Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. 
469 U.S. 189, 201 (1985). Although the Court justified its results in terms of the economic benefits of 
trademarks, the Court’s Park ‘N Fly opinion has been criticized as going beyond the economic rationale 
for trademark protection. See Suman Naresh, Incontestability and Rights in Descriptive Trademarks, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 986–87 (1986). 
 170 Kantorczyk, supra note 159. 
 171 Though 15 U.S.C. §1064(3) allows for the petition for cancellation on grounds of genericism and 
functionality, in addition to the situational factors that make this particularly unlikely in this case, it is not 
clear that these grounds would lead to the mark’s cancellation in absence of some embrace of the 
communicative functionality and consumer-focused reframing of the product definition discussed supra. 
15:149 (2018) Mutating Marks: Refusing to Lose the Trademark Trail 
177 
the loosening of trademark standards, but consumer confusion caused by this 
counterintuitive mark has not been considered when tightening standards.172 
As discussed in Section II. B. Inherent Goodwill, marks are not merely 
information conduits, but often contain information themselves. Thus far, 
there are no preventative measures for marks providing false information 
unless they are directly impersonating another person or entity as a source. 
To see the issue presented, contemplate another mark filed in anticipation: 
the New England Patriots registration of “19-0”173 in 2008. This was filed as 
the team neared a historic, second-ever perfect season in the NFL. However, 
the team ultimately fell short of this record, going 18-1. Representatives of 
the Patriots have continued to exhaust extensions of the mark’s protection, 
submitting proof of commercial use as recently as May 2015.174 It seems 
inexplicably bizarre to imagine that the Patriots have continuously used a 
football statistic in commerce, despite never actually achieving it. What 
could the team possibly be selling? In the intervening 7.5 years, the Patriots 
held hostage the public’s ability to sell an array of goods bearing that record, 
which someday the Patriots may actually earn.175 
B. Quality Standards 
Quality control of marks is conceptually challenging in the modern 
market. When fewer products are physical goods, the standards of a use 
justifying trademark protection become harder to define. With the boom of 
promotional merchandising, the question of functionality is answered 
resoundingly by producers stating brand-enhancement is the goal and 
consumers are expected, if not assumed, to concur. 
1. Source of Quality 
Which fundamental quality is under control, and who enforces that 
control, are questions that the courts have approached in several cases 
surrounding a particular cultural phenomenon: boybands.176 A test177 was 
 
 172 This contributes to and reflects the influence of mark holders in shaping trademark law, see infra 
Section IV C.11. Circularly Setting Perceptions. 
 173 19-0, Registration No. 77374670. 
 174 19-0 - Trademark Details, JUSTIA, available at https://trademarks.justia.com/773/74/19-0-
77374670.html [https://perma.cc/YX3E-B4G7]. 
 175 Although many more games are played in NCAA Basketball—and thus 19-0 does not hold the 
allure of indicating a lossless season—in this time period, this is one prominent sport where records of 
19-0 have been achieved (and surpassed), by Wichita State in 2014 and the University of Kentucky in 
2015. Perhaps one of these teams would have been interested in possessing mark rights to this record for 
its iconic implications. The latter team’s coach, John Calipari, evidences an appreciation for trademark 
registration as documented infra, note 207. 
 176 McGuffey, supra note 153, at 191. 
 177 Bell v. Streetwise Records, Ltd., 640 F. Supp. 575 (D. Mass. 1986). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
178 
determined to establish ownership: identifying the marks’ “distinctive 
quality” according to the relevant public, and then determining the controller 
of that quality. Here, the court treated the conception of the relevant public 
with realism. 
The relevant market for teen heartthrobs—pre-teen and younger 
teenage girls—is not primarily concerned with the physical goods of a CD 
or even the quality of the music that it plays. It is instead the band associated 
with the music—the band linked to the music by its image and personality—
that draws fans in: 
They were individual persons that the public came to know as such. While 
defendants would have us believe this is only the result of their successful 
promoting, I find that it was personality, not marketing, that led to the public’s 
intimacy with plaintiffs. The “magic” that sold New Edition, and which “New 
Edition” has come to signify, is these five young men.178 
The notable exception is a publicly-recognized concept group, a la the 
“Menudo Model.”179 It was widely publicized that “Menudo” was, and would 
perpetually remain, a group of under-16-year-old Latino boys. Thus, the 
controller of the group as a whole was understood to be the constant source 
of Menudo-ness, not the interchangeable members themselves. 
Sports teams have the parallel of a (hopefully) consistent coach, tasked 
with quality: controlling a team. However, if public conception truly drives 
attribution, one may find that an essential quality of a team may be affiliated 
with the athletic director, school, or student body.180 As has been argued in 
proceedings against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
for profiting off athlete likeness, individuals have at least a marginally 
demonstrative effect on merchandise sales and contributions to a team’s 
essence. Some products, a specific player’s jersey for instance, are fairly 
obvious reflections of individual value and quality contributions.181 
 
 178 Id. at 582. 
 179 Supra note 176, at 191. 
 180 Infra note 353. 
 181 Ari Wasserman, An ‘Epidemic’ of Fake Ohio State Jerseys: Why Buckeyes Fans Are Buying Them 
and What it Means for the Program, CLEVELAND.COM (last updated Apr. 21, 2016, 4:14 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/osu/index.ssf/2015/11/an_epidemic_of_fake_ohio_state.html 
[https://perma.cc/894S-BVGX] (discussing the popularity of non-licensed jerseys replicating Ohio State 
University’s jerseys and purchased due to the cost-prohibitive price point of official merchandise as well 
as a desire to acquire specific player names and numbers). Interestingly enough, jerseys of specific players 
were recently pulled from official offerings because of player lawsuits for non-compensation for their 
likeness in these sales. This trend is, ironically, evidence to the players’ point against the NCAA, but the 
result still leaves them uncompensated. 
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2. Diminishing Expectations of Control 
The judiciary’s tone on concern for trademark quality control has 
consistently diminished with time.182 In common law prior to the Lanham 
Act, an actual source’s indication was required for a mark to be considered 
valid.183 As licensing informally appeared in the business world, the early 
cases condemned those who did not exclusively use their trademarks under 
strict controls, exacting uniformity.184 Usage by “related companies” was 
formally introduced by the Lanham Act,185 defined in section 45: “The term 
‘related company’ means any person who legitimately controls or is 
controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in respect to the 
nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark 
is used.”186 
Legitimate or adequate, control was never explicitly defined, but 
exercising it in some capacity was mandatory, as wholly-uncontrolled marks 
were found invalid.187 Quality control rationalized the extension into 
licensing, as the mark’s inferred quality to consumers was ensured when “the 
plaintiff sufficiently policed and inspected its licensees’ operations to 
guarantee the quality of the products they sold under its trademarks to the 
public.”188 
Standards then were also interpreted to require “actual” control. 
Basically, standards in practice had to be maintained, though specifics no 
longer need to be formally stated.189 Yet other courts accepted expressly 
stated controls, declining to find abandonment even when those standards 
were not actually enforced.190 The standard benchmark of “adequate” 
controls shifted to “sufficient” and then to “minimal” controls.191 Several 
cases from the mid-century onward overlooked a lack of any affirmative 
control, so long as the products did not deceive192 the public. A structural 
 
 182 See Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” In Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. 
L. REV. 341, 351–52 (2007). 
 183 See, e.g., Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474–75 (8th Cir. 
1901). 
 184 Broeg v. Duchaine, 67 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Mass. 1946) (stating that the license at issue was not 
valid because it was not subject to any requirement that the licensee’s products conform to fixed 
standards). 
 185 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (1964). 
 186 Id. § 1127. 
 187 See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Lincoln Laboratories, Inc., 322 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1963). 
 188 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 189 Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Int’l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 190 Pike v. Ruby Foo’s Den, Inc., 232 F.2d 683, 685–86 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
 191 Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 192 See Land O’Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 330 F.2d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 
1964); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1022 (9th Cir. 1985); Taco Cabana 
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impediment to enforcing quality control standards is posed by the doctrine 
of licensee estoppel, preventing those who have been licensed to use a 
mark—likely those with the best information on the existence of such 
controls—from challenging the mark’s validity.193 
C. Creation of Commercial Association 
In expanding trademark rights past source attribution, courts have 
accepted the “creation of a commercial association” as both something that 
may not be wrongfully implied by non-mark holders, and evidence of mark 
ownership by the rightful ones. Thus, this expansion may be used as a 
double-edged sword in trademark law. Commercial association has been 
described in terms of expenditures, advertising, timelines and breadth of use, 
and distinctiveness of use. Importantly, this association-building is a 
common route for privatizing non-mark attributes. 
Association construction has caught the ire of trademark holders in the 
circumstances of “ambush marketing.”194 This is when outsider businesses 
craft unsanctioned paths to consumers, reaching them in some channel where 
mark holders feel they have an exclusive claim. For instance, the National 
Hockey League (NHL) attempted to enjoin Pepsi from referring to “pro-
hockey” teams or mentioning teams’ home cities in commercials aired 
during game broadcasts without entering into an official relationship with 
the league.195 However, all of Pepsi’s content explained its lack of affiliation 
with the NHL, which Canadian courts found effectively eliminated whatever 
minimal possibility of confusion might have been created, so the action 
failed. 
A famed “ambush marketing” incident, which never made it to court, 
centers on the 2010 Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) World Cup.196 Bavaria Beer gave away about 120,000 bright-orange 
and branded lederhosen to enraged Dutch fans at a match-up, without 
sponsorship by the governing body, FIFA. Attention-grabbing use of team 
colors attracted fans, and so many of them showed up in the sponsored gear 
that FIFA officials took notice. FIFA officials reacted by requiring many fans 
 
Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992). Notably the 
facts of all these cases included a long-standing close working relationships in which the assumption of 
standards being met was reasonably solid, and, despite a lack of controls, such standards were maintained. 
 193 See Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Sols., 650 F. 3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussing the 
doctrine though limiting it to direct licensees, not licensee affiliates). 
 194 See Edward Vassallo, Kristin Blemaster & Patricia Werner, An International Look at Ambush 
Marketing, 95 TRADEMARK REP., 1338 (2005) (including a thorough discussion of international 
treatments of ambush marketing, which is largely unaddressed in the United States judiciary as of yet). 
 195 Nat’l Hockey League. v. Pepsi-Cola Can. Ltd. (1992), 70 B. C. L. R. 2d 27 (Can. B.C. S.C.). 
 196 Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010). 
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to strip the lederhosen off before entering the stadium, leaving stands full of 
Dutch spectators dressed only in their underpants. Ostensibly, the incorrect 
commercial association Bavaria was forging with FIFA was under attack 
here. However, the game attendees could hardly be confused as to the 
singular official beer sponsor, as Budweiser was the only brew available for 
sale in the stadium. Perhaps the Bavaria logo would be displayed in 
broadcasts, but limiting exposure via camera operation seems an easier 
remedy. By the time fans entering a stadium are being asked to disrobe, 
personal expression is being quelled for misappropriation of FIFA’s 
marketing power. Curious also is the unexamined commercial association at 
play. Are fans choosing to attend or watch the match because of their 
reverence for the controversial FIFA brand, or their own love of the sport, 
team, or national pride, which happens to be embodied by the color 
orange?197 
It is now commonplace to hear about brands forging back-alley 
“ambush marketing” associations through tangential sponsorship. Beats 
headphones distributed to and worn by Olympic stars gained Beats 
international attention without the cost of an official partnership.198 Athletes 
and celebrities alike are given numerous free products for the potential value 
of their exposure as advertisement (if not endorsement).199 If brands can take 
advantage of this publicity for their own marks, how can they stop others 
from doing the same? Rationalizing an exclusive right to control all possible 
commercial connotations effectively freezes that event or product right 
where the owner wants it, untouchable to anyone else’s interpretation or 
use—including consumers. 
Authorship of a commercial link is largely assumed at mark registration 
without inquiry. Absent proof of commercial use has led to the “race to 
register” terms, including some of the opportunistic instances previously 
outlined.200 Determining to whom the mark rights should go is often solved 
by the fiduciary nature of many agency relationships in business, but it is 
less clear when institutions and individuals may have various stakes to a 
mark. 
 
 197 This falls into the concerns discussed supra Section B. Inherent Goodwill. 
 198 Andrew Hamp, How Beats By Dre Got Their Headphones On Olympians’ Ears (Despite 
Violating IOC Policy), BILLBOARD, (July 31, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/
articles/news/branding/1084390/how-beats-by-dre-got-their-headphones-on-olympians-ears-despite 
[https://perma.cc/NSF9-C8HC]. 
 199 Interview with Heather Lounsbury, Producer of product “placements” mentioned during the 
telecast of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Oscar Awards, in College Park, Md. (Aug. 
29, 2016). 
 200 See, e.g., supra note 118. 
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 “Refuse to lose” is both a catchy rhyme201 and a trademarked phrase. In 
a February 20, 2017 Google search, the first page of over sixteen million 
results includes songs by “Brotha Lynch Hung,”202 “Dead Prez,”203 and 
Jarekus Singleton,204 an anti-gang task force in Lakeland, Florida205 and one 
reference to a book authored by John Calipari. Calipari personally applied 
for registration of the phrase as a trademark in 1994206 after using it 
motivationally as a third-year head coach for the University of Massachusetts 
men’s basketball team. The school was familiar with the motto, popularized 
by a shirt made by senior players about their successful 1990 men’s football 
team.207 But UMass’ use was not unique, since initial mark registration was 
actually sought out by the coach for women’s tennis at Duke University.208 
To understand claims of attribution, it should be acknowledged that 
John Calipari is undoubtedly as savvy a marketer209 as he is a coach (and he 
is a quite successful coach).210 He negotiated ESPN airtime by accepting a 
midnight “madness” game and continually praised the fan base, which then 
rose to meet his expectations.211 Publicity bred athletic recruiting, which bred 
success that benefitted UMass as a whole. Calipari had “refuse to lose” 
embroidered on the team’s warm-up outfits, which were now more and more 
frequently televised. Sponsorship deals followed for “refuse to lose” 
 
 201 Pagliero, supra note 112, (a distinctive pattern could be artistic and desirable in a printed design. 
The intrinsic pleasantness of a linguistic pattern, such as rhyme, has yet to be considered for its non-
reputational advantages over less aesthetically appealing use of language); Hughes, supra note 14, at 
1251, (linguistic advantages are potential examples of embedded psychological or cognitive functions a 
mark may be capable of serving). 
 202 Brotha Lynch Hung, Refuse to Lose, YOUTUBE (Apr. 11, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=T91l758lJb4. 
 203 Dead Prez, Refuse to Lose, YOUTUBE (July 5, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=frFCbUoQcVU. 
 204 http://www.amazon.com/Refuse-To-Lose-Jarekus-Singleton/dp/B00ITNG4P0. 
 205 Refuse to Lose Make the Pledge, CITY OF LAKELAND, https://www.lakelandgov.net/
departments/lakeland-police-department/refuse-to-lose/ [https://perma.cc/5YY5-45D5]. 
 206 REFUSE TO LOSE, Registration No. 2,048,577. 
 207 Former UMass Coach Seeks Trademark on Slogan, AP NEWS ARCHIVE (Jul. 18, 1996, 6:57 AM), 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1996/Former-UMass-Coach-Seeks-Trademark-on-Slogan/id-
321a3e72dc1c0e0e34e466699e059847 (“‘That slogan was meant for the football team and any other 
program at the university. It was not meant to make one individual wealthy,’ Paul Mayberry, a co-captain 
and All America on the 1990 football team, told the Globe.”) [https://perma.cc/FK6X-P2BV]. 
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branded—as well as general—school merchandise, so both Calipari and the 
university benefitted.212 It is no wonder that UMass did not protest when 
Calipari took rights to the school motto with him to a short-lived NBA 
coaching job in 1996, promising to allow UMass continued free usage, but 
collecting all outside licensing fees for himself. The school has credited him 
with “catapulting” them to “national prominence,”213 which would plainly 
indicate that at least those school authorities believe a commercial attribution 
to the coach is legitimate.214 
Still, as with “three-peat,”215 this evolves into a coach taking credit and 
compensation for a phrase popularized by his team, then continuing to 
benefit later on as a direct competitor of that team. Consider the institution’s 
possible claim to mark rights. While Calipari was an impactful coach at 
UMass, he was also the university’s employee (and a state employee at that), 
with a fiduciary duty to put the institution’s commercial interests ahead of 
his own. One may assume that does not include promoting his money-
making mark’s notoriety via university broadcasts and mandated team 
apparel. “Refuse to lose” now holds licensing deals with teams and athletes 
such as the Seattle Mariners216 Major League Baseball team, and Jeff 
Gordon217 of NASCAR. This raises issues since both are hard to conceive as 
related to an NCAA basketball coach, as well as firmly entrenched with 
different meanings for relevant consumers.218 Those two other groups of fans 
may all want wins—to “refuse to lose” them in fact—in each respective 
sport, and the “qualities” necessary for this achievement vary greatly. If not 
due to its inherently pleasing cadence and rhyme,219 or its status as a 
laudatory phrase, the mark’s genericism and lack of relevant consumer 
association should void the mark, if it were ever contested in court. 
 
 212 Id. 
 213 Michael Powell, Violations by John Calipari’s Teams? Don’t Look at Him, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/sports/ncaabasketball/coach-caliparis-wonderful-life-
begin-the-disclaimers.html [https://perma.cc/ZX3P-CW7F]. 
 214 Id. UMass basketball’s highest nationally recognized achievement is still a Final Four appearance 
in Calipari’s final coaching term. Ironically, given the NCAA’s publicity and legal trouble, surrounding 
profits made off of unpaid student-athletes, that peak appearance was vacated for NCAA violations 
shortly after his departure. Still, it has not altered the university’s sentimental affections. 
 215 See Kantorczyk, supra note 159. 
 216 Matthew Halverson, Crazy Freaking Castoffs, SEATTLEMET (Sept. 23, 2015, 11:39 AM), 
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 218 See supra Section III. B. 
 219 See Hughes, supra note 14 (discussing cognitive preference for some marks inherently over 
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1. Circularly Setting Perceptions 
While establishing commercial association presents normative issues, 
so does the tangential subject of “consumer confusion” surrounding those 
associations. Initially, courts punished users who created doubt in consumer 
minds as to whether or not there was a trademark link on a product being 
sold. At its purest form, outright deceptiveness would lead to proof that 
actual consumers were misled, easily justifying this protection. However, the 
definition has broadened in tandem with mark holder rights. Thoroughness 
in considerations contributed to developing multifactor tests for confusion,220 
a rational response to situations such as the relatedness of products found in 
Aunt Jemima.221 Confusion expanded from actually misleading consumers to 
include causing momentary confusion, even when overcome before a 
purchase is made.222 “Likelihood” originally implied a probability of 
confusion, but some have interpreted the standard more broadly, instead 
imposing liability for a mere possibility of confusion.223 
Semantic stretching deforms the meaning of “confusion” and 
“consumers” as well. In Boston Professional Hockey Association, Inc. v. 
Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc.,224 the court found that, despite 
consumers’ correct knowledge and impression about the origin of a product, 
conjuring a mental association with another mark holder qualified as 
“confusion.”225 This finding overlooked the products at hand being distantly 
removed from the mark holder’s sphere of interests, distinguishing the case 
from the Au-Tomotive precedent. This was a major leap in prohibiting 
 
 220 See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid Corp. v. 
Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (explaining how the multiple factors considered 
in determining consumer confusion are elaborated as: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the proximity of 
the goods; (3) the similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) the similarity of marketing 
channels used; (6) the degree of caution exercised by the typical purchaser; and (7) the defendant’s intent). 
 221 See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 222 See Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark 
Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005). 
 223 See, e.g., Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 1995) (The court 
found that, at least in trade dress, the lower standard of possible confusion was only appropriate as a 
contribution to a multifactor analysis of a likelihood of confusion, and could not hold its own.); Merchant 
& Evans, Inc., v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods., 963 F.2d 628, 637–38 (3rd Cir. 1992); Country Floors, Inc. v. 
A Partnership Composed of Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3rd Cir. 1991); Telechron, Inc. v. 
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confusion’ standard.”). Versa Prods. Co., 50 F.3d at 200. 
 224 Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
 225 Id. at 1012. 
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confusion that did not, in any common sense, actually exist.226 It has 
effectively conflated causing associative thought with confusion. 
In many cases dealing with potentially real consumer confusion, courts 
have declared that disclaimers are adequately clarifying and useful to balance 
rights and freedoms of speech. However, this protection does not always 
apply. The University of Georgia227 succeeded in an infringement case, 
rejecting disclaimers as capable of protecting marks from third parties. The 
Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) represents Georgia, among many 
universities around the country, in licensing matters. All official member 
merchandise bears a mandatory hologram tag, which represents the 
authenticity of licensed products.228 As a secondary mark for further 
identification of official items, it also—by effect and design—demonstrates 
which goods are unofficial. The business-minded state of trademark law does 
not acknowledge this state of affairs. Even when confusion is nearly 
impossible, consumers’ possible interest in purchasing the unofficial form is 
quashed. The reality is stark when compared to the information-transmission 
or consumer-interest foundations on which trademarks lie.229 
There are instances of boldfaced denial or intentional obtuseness by 
mark holders, in regard to consumer perceptions, as well as to their own legal 
standing. These are “strike suits,”230 baseless cease-and-desist threats and 
filings often intended to broaden mark holder rights by deterring legitimate 
market entrees.231 Some baseless trademark-based cases are less sinister, if 
only because their purpose is more challenging to parse. For example, Louis 
Vuitton232 sent to a Penn Law fashion intellectual property symposium a 
cease-and-desist letter, regarding a flyer that featured a twist on the Louis 
Vuitton monogram pattern.233 Clearly, that flyer’s “consumers” were an 
audience discussing the very law at hand, rendering perhaps the lowest 
 
 226 Criticized roundly, e.g., supra note 116. 
 227 Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 228 FAQs: Consumer - How do I know that a product is licensed and approved by an institution?, 
COLLEGIATE LICENSING COMPANY (“CLC”), http://www.clc.com/Resources/FAQs.aspx#
CatLink7e6f57f5-d209-4b9f-9bd0-a631b670def0 (last visited Feb. 28, 2017) (advising customers to 
“look for the Officially Licensed Collegiate Product (OLCP) hologram label,” which all of the CLC’s 
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athletic conferences) mandate for the sale of their products) [https://perma.cc/5Q7A-QJBC]. 
 229 See supra Section I. A. 
 230 See Port, supra note 31, at 589. 
 231 See discussion of dynamic compounds supra Section IV.A. 
 232 See also Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 233 Michael Risch, Really, Louis Vuitton? Really?, MADISONIAN.NET (Mar. 4, 2012), 
http://madisonian.net/2012/03/04/really-louis-vuitton/ [https://perma.cc/U3RZ-GNYJ ] (The cease-and-
desist letter even journeys into their take on consumer confusion, accusing the IP professors of misleading 
consumers to think this was legal use because they “must be experts” when in fact the only issue was 
whether the flyer conveyed a true perception to the viewer (the public)). 
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likelihood of confusion conceivable.234 In critiquing this action, the law 
community raised arguments of parody, fair use, and a lack of commercial 
use in promoting a free educational symposium, as well as a flyer’s clear 
distinction from handbags. To quote one legal blog’s analysis, “Louis 
Vuitton either has a very finely tuned sense of irony, or none at all.”235 This 
was a rather brash example of a mark holder stepping confidently outside the 
scope of reasonable protections its mark is afforded in order to threaten legal 
action. Most troubling, with an even slightly less sophisticated (or financially 
and legally armed) letter recipient, this type of trademark bullying likely 
creates ever more confusion concerning which types of mark use are legally 
permissible, and threatens to chill free speech. 
The interpretation of “consumer” in “consumer confusion” has been 
equally untenable. An “average consumer” is imagined to have widely 
ranging capability and discernment.236 Controversially, confusion also 
expands to include post-purchase, meaning the confusion of some third-party 
onlooker, other than the consumer. It abandons the intention of facilitating a 
market’s information transmission, and punishes an accurate one. Instead, 
this crystallizes one mark’s meaning beyond the point-of-sale, into an entity 
to be preserved in everyday life and not to be encroached upon by non-
commercial activity of everyday people. The doctrine of initial interest 
confusion, too, runs against the market-facilitating grain.237 These two 
mutations stem from misplaced fealty to producer interests. 
If the bounds of confusion are, well, confusing, the standards of proof 
in applying them are as well. The definition of a relevant-consumer market 
is largely unstable,238 and thus, interpreting people’s conception of a mark is 
also. Consumer surveys are often cited as the most persuasive form of proof 
for the court.239 However, structural limitations are often ignored, including 
consideration of effects under reader-response theory, 240 observer effect, and 
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other concepts.241 Inconsistencies in applying consumer studies to cases by 
the court are more troublesome. The distinct meaning of specific words is 
crucial to drawing accurate mark boundaries, yet the delicateness of 
language is often eschewed. For example, one case accepted proof of 
infringement from a study that asked if one term “goes along with” another. 
242 In addition to that questionable phrasing, the court accepted 10% 
consumer agreement with that statement as a sufficient level to find 
confusion. Other cases have rejected survey findings at levels of 14% to 31% 
confusion.243 It is not just the meaning of confusion or consumers or 
standards of proof that are unpredictable, but all of the above. 
These changes unilaterally favor the strengthening of mark protections. 
Mark holder influence in shaping trademark law is strong, even beyond one’s 
potential influence as the party most aligned with legal precedent. Indeed, 
the way that trademarks are utilized in commerce informs consumer 
expectations of what is proper and legally necessary. This is how the Boston 
Hockey ruling of confusion originated.244 It does not matter that the usage 
was known to be unofficial and that mark holders factually, at that time, 
lacked the legal basis to impede it. These and similar mark holders behave 
as if they have rights to all expressions of their trademarks in their 
commercial and legal activity. The fact that this misleads consumers is then 
bizarrely legitimized when courts then bar a third-party’s conduct, although 
normally lawful, in order to eliminate such confusion. So, the mark holder 
has created the circumstances that sow the confusion which redounds to the 
mark holder’s own benefit: truly a circular path to mark holder victory 
through manipulated perceptions. 
2. Double Meaning of Word and Law 
In determining where a trademark is classified on the spectrum of 
distinctiveness,245 the denotations and connotations of each word are 
important issues of fact. The difference between an inherently distinctive 
suggestive mark and a descriptive mark is one of a “minimal mental leap” 
 
interpretations to a single correct meaning or answer as articulated in a questionnaire. . . . Then we treat 
the variation from the preconceived correct meaning as a form of error.”). 
 241 Bird, supra note 239. 
 242 Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d, 836 F.2d 397 (8th 
Cir. 1987). “Goes along with” could be interpreted to establish a relationship quite distinct from 
confusion, conceivably. If a poll were conducted to measure if a brand of peanut butter, for example, 
“goes along with” a brand of jelly, response rates would likely be far above the 10% threshold that was 
found to be sufficient here, though obviously these two products are complimentary and quite distinct 
from one another. Id. 
 243 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 244 Voortman, supra note 139. 
 245 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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made by consumers, which is challenging to measure objectively; one may 
consider it to be the amount of imagination consumers require to connect the 
mark to the product’s image or shape. The critical standard is that 
establishing the mark should not unjustly interfere with competitors’ right to 
accurately characterize their own wares. Further up the distinctive scale, 
valid arbitrary marks rely on consumers’ ability to deal with homophones as 
they add a new meaning to an existing word. However, in cases of dilution, 
mark holders essentially argue that when consumers use that same mental 
capacity, which allows for a secondary meaning forged by arbitrary marks, 
this offends their mark’s legitimacy and value. 
Dilution was first established by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 
1995 (“FTDA”),246 protecting famous marks from non-confusing uses that 
would water down the original mark in consumers’ minds. The Supreme 
Court interpreted this in 2003 to mean that a mark holder must be able to 
prove that actual dilution and harm was taking place.247 Congress responded 
by passing the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”).248 It 
clarified the definition of the “famous marks,”249 lowered the standard to a 
“likelihood” of dilution, and explained its two forms: tarnishment250 and 
blurring.251 On remand, in light of the TDRA, the facts from the original 2003 
Supreme Court case, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., were found to be 
a dilution,252 though a strong dissent criticized the other justices for accepting 
a “possibility” instead of true “likelihood.”253 In summary, since inception, 
dilution has slid the way much of trademark law in general has: into leniency 
in favor of mark holder rights. 
Dilution is triggered where “in the mind of the consumer, the junior 
mark will conjure an association with the senior.”254 There is no confusion, 
which would be traditional infringement, but the courts have established 
dilution occurs when consumers who fully understand the sources of all 
respective goods are led to even think of a commonly known famous mark. 
This attempt to control mark connotations, absent confusion, lacks logical 
 
 246 Pub. L. No. 104–98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)). 
 247 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432–34 (2003). 
 248 Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)). 
 249 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012). See Robert W. Emerson & Catherine R. Willis, “International 
Franchise Trademark Registration: Legal Regimes, Costs and Consequences,” 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1 (2017) (discussing, inter alia, famous marks and international trademark registration). 
 250 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2012). 
 251 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
 252 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1003 (2011). 
 253 Id. at 394 (mirroring the stretching of consumer confusion from a standard of actuality to a 
standard likelihood and then to something less than that). 
 254 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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bounds, especially given the interconnected nature of the language that 
necessarily comprises all words used for speech, writing, and trademarks. 
For example, Coach, the handbag and leather-goods brand, sued an 
academic tutor coaching service.255 Coach lost its case due to a failure to 
submit adequate proof of the mark’s fame. While the court mentioned the 
academic service had “distinct meanings and commercial impressions” that 
would not necessarily have bearing, given the dilution statute. Marks 
carrying separate commercial impressions could still conjure thoughts of the 
senior one, and indeed, that is what the lack of confusion necessary for 
dilution implies. 
“Coach,” when applied to leather goods, was likely an arbitrary mark.256 
While Coach, Inc. was established in 1941,257 the word pre-dated the brand 
with established meanings in other contexts dating back to the 1500s.258 
Academic tutors, as well as motivational sports trainers or transportation 
services, all have a plainly descriptive use for the term. Many other 
businesses may have reasonable suggestive uses, too. 259 For instance, a 
sports bar name including the word “Coach” would be implying a sports-
centric meaning, far removed from the purse company’s interests, in a way 
that would otherwise be inherently distinctive. The definition of famous 
marks indicates perception among the general public as a source of goods.260 
However, that does not necessarily mean that is the mark’s sole or even most 
prominent meaning, in every circumstance, to every consumer. 
In Visa International Service Assn. v. JSL Corp.,261 the court denied a 
multilingual education service’s defense that it was using the common 
meanings of the word “visa,” 262 stating that the service had instead created a 
 
 255 Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d, 
No. 2011-1129, 2012 WL 540069 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012). 
 256 See supra, Section I. C. Spectrum of Distinctiveness. 
 257 Company Profile, COACH, http://www.coach.com/company-information.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160316143537/www.coach.com/company-information.html]. 
 258 Coach, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=coach 
[https://perma.cc/HPR2-2D4A]. 
 259 Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 743 (2004) (“The word ‘ice’ 
is generic for cubes of frozen water, but was held to be a suggestive and therefore protectable mark with 
respect to chewing gum. ‘Ice’ also has been used as a trademark for beer, and in one lawsuit was asserted 
to be generic by one litigant, while the mark holder claimed that the relationship between ice and beer 
was ‘either arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive.”). 
 260 Emerson & Willis, supra note 249, at 13–14 (“A mark is considered well-known or famous if it 
is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of the source 
of goods or services of the mark’s owner.”). 
 261 610 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 262 Id. at 1089. 
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“novel meaning” wrongfully263 competing with Visa credit cards, regardless 
of “allusions to the dictionary definition.” The court addressed the senior 
mark’s interaction with dictionary definition: “The Visa mark draws on 
positive mental associations with travel visas, which make potentially 
difficult transactions relatively simple and facilitate new opportunities and 
experiences. Those are good attributes for a credit card.” Those same mental 
associations and attributes are equally beneficial to a language-learning 
service, regardless of credit cards that boast similar ideals. Notably, although 
the court stated that Visa “draws on” these presumably inherent mental 
associations, credit is not given for creating them. However, the dilution 
doctrine crystallizes the word’s meaning; it may only either narrowly 
describe a literal visa or describe closely related qualities exclusively for the 
Visa credit card. Privatizing all the word’s connotations silences much more 
expression than trademark’s justifications can support. 
Granting these sweeping rights to only one class—famous marks—may 
be rationalized as protecting dominant consumer interpretations, but is unfair 
to other marks if we deem the public capable of comprehending multiple 
meanings without issue. The more famous mark is not necessarily the 
original one, creating a situation where an older and legitimately strong mark 
may be attacked for “diluting” one that gains non-confusing fame, which it 
had no recourse to prevent. It is similar to the impropriety addressed by the 
uncommon doctrine of reverse-confusion.264 This is when a chronologically 
senior mark user claims that a subsequent junior mark usage is so extensive 
that it erodes the senior mark’s value, causing consumers to mistakenly 
believe the more common junior mark is the original owner.265 In response 
this “takeover,” the junior mark holders respond with a defense by way of 
the mark’s capability for dual meanings. 
An illuminating example comes from the case of Illinois High School 
Association v. GTE Vantage Inc.266 The phrase “March Madness” can be 
traced back to a basketball-themed volume of essays and poems by Henry 
Porter, a pioneer of the sport.267 The Illinois High School Association dubbed 
 
 263 Eric Goldman, Puzzling 9th Circuit Dilution Opinion over eVisa.com—Visa v. JSL, TECH. & 
MARKETING L. BLOG (Jul. 6, 2010), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/07/puzzling_9th_ci.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EER5-3369] (criticizing this ruling for also interpreting the standard of “likelihood of 
confusion” without any proof, and, instead, simply by the “characteristics of the marks at issue.”). 
 264 Anthony L. Fletcher, The Curious Doctrine of Reverse Confusion—Getting It Right in Reverse, 
95 TRADEMARK REP. 1273 (2005). 
 265 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:10 
(4th ed. 2004). 
 266 99 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997). 
 267 Nathan Fenno, Heart of Madness, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/
mar/20/sports/la-sp-march-madness-illinois-20140320 [https://perma.cc/5TGZ-GHZH] (Porter also 
connected “midnight madness” to the sport, and designed fan-shaped backboards). 
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its playoff basketball tournament “March Madness” in 1939 and officially 
merchandised it as such in 1973.268 Nine years later, CBS anchor Brent 
Musburger first identified the NCAA college basketball tournament as 
“March Madness” on air.269 A decade later, CBS registered the mark in 
relation to the televised NCAA tournament.270 The power of broadcasting in 
appropriating the word’s meaning was acknowledged by the Seventh Circuit: 
Most people know what they know about college basketball from the media. If 
the media call the NCAA tournament “March Madness,” that is what the public 
will call it, or know it as. IHSA argues that it is unfair to make its rights depend 
on the whims of the media. Because a court could not, without violating the 
free-speech clause of the First Amendment, have enjoined (or used other legal 
remedies to prevent or deter) the media from calling the NCAA tournament 
“March Madness,” IHSA was helpless to prevent its trademark from being 
transformed into the name of another product. Its property right should not, it 
argues, depend on events over which it has no control.271 
The First Amendment does protect the press’ right to speak a 
trademarked word or phrase, even if it does so in a transformative manner.272 
When CBS used “March Madness” solely in its broadcasts, it was fine. 
Marks may also be used referentially, even in purely commercial speech such 
as advertisements.273 So when the CBS broadcast–use turned the tide of the 
term’s meaning, it was then acceptable to advertise the CBS coverage by 
using the term. The court mentioned that the IHSA chose not to police the 
line where the media’s use extended beyond merely identifying the 
tournament, nor did IHSA strive to convince “lexicographically influential 
persons”274 of its mark’s meaning. However, there is no rationale to compel 
a mark holder to attempt such activity; mark holders have no such authority 
over broadcasters, so it is odd to critique a mark holder for not making 
demands that the court acknowledges would be unenforceable. 275 
 
 268 March Madness History, ILLINOIS HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, http://www.ihsa.org/
SportsActivities/MarchMadnessExperience/MarchMadnessHistory.aspx (last accessed Sept. 15, 2015) 
[https://perma.cc/9KGA-956Z] 
 269 Musburger was a sportswriter and broadcaster in the Chicago area in the early 1970s and 
frequently covered IHSA’s “March Madness” tournament. Although he did not mention the high school 
in the broadcast, he was exposed to the term in its original source. See Wes Smith, IHSA Jumping Through 
Hoops to Keep “March Madness” from NCAA, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1996, at C7. 
 270 Illinois High School Ass’n., 99 F.3d at 245. 
 271 Id. at 244. 
 272 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 273 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 274 Illinois High School Ass’n, 99 F.3d at 244. 
 275 See id. The court acknowledged that the likelihood of success in these endeavors was not strong 
given precedent, and conceded that if the public current conception of the word formed despite them, 
their legal determination would stand. Id. The IHSA was essentially scolded for not attempting assiduous 
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The decisive fact is that because the public is assumed to now believe 
that the mark refers to the NCAA tournament, original mark holders lack the 
injunctive right to compel them to now think otherwise. Similarly, generified 
terms cannot be resurrected,276 regardless of preventative conduct taken.277 
The IHSA decision takes a consequential new step of assimilating dual or 
multiple-use marks to these generic restrictions: “A trademark owner is not 
allowed to withdraw from the public domain a name that the public is using 
to denote someone else’s good or service, leaving that someone and his 
customers speechless.”278 The impulse here is to limit trademark rights, 
which ironically has opened the door for the NCAA to proceed with its use 
and notably aggressive defense of “March Madness” as their mark.279 
In another basketball case, Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. NBA 
Properties Inc.,280 the mark “Dream Team” was first utilized on sports 
trading cards, and the NBA subsequently began using the same term in 
reference to a men’s Olympic basketball team. The card company sued and 
alleged unauthorized use of the mark created reverse confusion, constituted 
trademark infringement, unfair competition, false advertising, and dilution 
 
persuasion through the press. Id. No legal defensive actions were overlooked however, and the court 
offered none. Id. This all goes to the point of an unfair advantage that large and well-financed corporations 
have in guiding trademark law: why should a court expect a high school association to have the financial 
resources to engage in what may even appear to be a fruitless effort? 
 276 Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957–58 (7th Cir. 1992). Even in 
anti-dilution territory, once distinctive nature is gone, so is protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012); 
see also McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1174 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 277 W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 347 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 278 Illinois High School Ass’n, 99 F.3d at 244. 
 279 Enforcement stretches to “march mania” and “march mayhem” claiming both words are 
synonyms for madness, tweaks including “live the madness” and “midnight radness,” as well as “The Big 
Dance,” “Final Four”, “Elite Eight”, and “Sweet Sixteen” in relation to basketball or possible 
endorsement. “Midnight Madness” is an egregious inclusion, if not because none of the NCAA March 
tournament is held at midnight, then because the NCAA itself documents the term’s origination by 
Maryland coach Lefty Driesell. See, e.g., Sandra Guy, Chicago Lawyer Tracks Down ‘March Madness’ 
Trademark Violators, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Mar. 21, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/sports/
chicago-lawyer-tracks-down-march-madness-trademark-violators/ [https://perma.cc/A8S5-EL85]; 
Melissa Block, NCAA Tries to Limit Use of March Madness, NPR (Apr. 03, 2009 3:44 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102726881 [https://perma.cc/TJP2-UAKA]; Tim 
Bannon, The Illinois Man Who Coined ‘March Madness,’ CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 14, 2015 10:15 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-flashback-march-madness-spt-0315-20150314-
story.html [https://perma.cc/9M2W-KFME]; Christopher Zara, Having a ‘March Madness’ Party? Be 
Careful What You Call It, I.B. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014 3:06 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/having-march-
madness-party-be-careful-what-you-call-it-1562145 [https://perma.cc/8CMT-3374]; Shaun Powell, The 
Father of Midnight Madness, NCAA (Oct. 14, 2011 10:06 AM), http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-
men/article/2011-10-01/father-midnight-madness [https://perma.cc/Q2DX-6W2Q] (“He only has one 
regret when he looks in the rearview mirror. ‘I should’ve trademarked the name Midnight Madness,’ he 
said. Another laugh. ‘Nowadays they have stores that conduct a Midnight Madness when they hold a sale. 
I could’ve made a lot of money.’”). 
 280 958 F. Supp. 1401 (E.D. Mo. 1997). 
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in violation the Lanham Act.281 The court rejected the NBA’s defense of a 
media-created meaning, citing a press release by the defendant as evidence 
of its propagation of association—using the media as a tool to take the 
trademark.282 This illustrates the possibility of lopsided protection more 
established mark holders can perpetuate, even as junior mark users. An 
explicit paper trail is not always going to be available when a mark is co-
opted, and even if it were there to be discovered, many small businesses 
would be unable to mount the expensive legal battle necessary against a 
behemoth the size of the NBA. 
D. USPTO Drops the Ball 
1. Scrutiny in Granting Marks 
Registered marks carry a lofty presumption of validity, yet the standards 
of registration have been gradually eroded, with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) contributing to these woes. While its 
responsibility to petition for generification has been eliminated,283 the PTO 
should still scrutinize applications that lean in that direction. Instead, the 
PTO, in some instances, effectively encourages bad faith applications. Damn 
I’m Good284 was initially rejected as a mark because it did not serve as a 
source identifier, as the words were featured in the manner of a prominently 
displayed285 slogan.286 Without altering or eliminating these primary 
functions, but with the simple addition of a second, conceivably source-
indicating format287 of the mark, the registration was granted. In this case, the 
PTO advised registrants to add a removable tag featuring the mark. Damn 
I’m Good was later invalidated in court for the same reason it was initially 
rejected: not actually serving mark purpose in the customer’s mind.288 The 
PTO gives credit to usages that “may be likely to create the commercial 
impression of a trademark,”289 but does not appear to balance this against 
uses that leave distinctly non-mark impressions. While secondary meaning 
 
 281 Id. at 1403. 
 282 Id. at 1411. 
 283 Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, supra note 166. 
 284 Damn I’m Good, Inc., v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 285 T.M.E.P. § 1202.03(a) (2007) (stating a prominently featured word may be perceived as 
ornamental). 
 286 T.M.E.P. § 1202.03(f)(i) (2007) (stating a prominently depicted slogan may be perceived as 
expressive rather than source-indicatory). 
 287 T.M.E.P. § 1202.03(a) (2007) (describing subtler word usage as more evocative of trademarks’ 
source-indicatory impression). 
 288 Damn I’m Good, Inc., 514 F. Supp. at 1361. 
 289 T.M.E.P. § 1202.03(a) (2007). 
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is not necessary to register most marks, when a distinct primary goal other 
than source identification is clear, feigning ignorance will not do either. 
In the aforementioned case, the primary objective was clear to the PTO 
from its own analysis of the initial application. In a broader context, 
appraisals would do well to implement some minimal standards as evidence 
that a would-be mark primarily functions as such before approval.290 Absence 
of or inconsistency in these standards allows marks to slip through the 
cracks, interfering with the operation of language in markets and beyond. 
Take for example, the term “frugalista,” a finalist for New Oxford 
American Dictionary’s word of the year in 2008.291 Eight days after that 
announcement, the standard character mark was registered292 to a blogger 
who quickly set to work petitioning the dozens293 of other bloggers, who were 
using the term self-referentially, to cease. The PTO does not explain its 
position on a mark’s level of distinctiveness, but, from this word’s dictionary 
definition, it would appear to be plainly descriptive of the authors or topics 
of all of the blogs at hand. Some rather abstract modern products, such as 
blogs, may be challenging to conceptualize within traditional distinctiveness 
analysis. In particular, identifying the requisite “mental leap” that 
distinguishes permissible suggestive marks from generally unacceptable 
descriptive marks may prove tough. But in this example the fact that the word 
has a rather precise denotation precludes a fanciful classification; from that 
dictionary definition, the term could be seen to plainly describe someone 
knowledgeable of consumer information and financial advice, as the 
registrant’s blog advertised itself.294 It was not the first blog to do so, and in 
fact only launched after the term had risen to fame. 
The board’s willingness to accept an applicant’s justificatory arguments 
for a mark without binding the applicant to its contentions undermines the 
scrutiny of trademark applications and tarnishes the board’s approval process 
for marks. That mark holders can and do renege on their arguments asserting 
validity once they hold the rights is a cause of unpredictability and 
 
 290 Suggested infra Section V. D. Making the Calls. 
 291 Oxford Word of the Year 2008: Hypermiling, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS BLOG (Nov. 10, 2008), 
http://blog.oup.com/2008/11/hypermiling/ [https://perma.cc/P3DA-M3CH] (“A person who leads a 
frugal lifestyle, but stays fashionable and healthy by swapping clothes, buying second-hand, growing own 
produce, etc.”). 
 292 FRUGALISTA, Registration No. 3532912. 
 293 Kimberly Palmer, “Frugalista” Debate: One Blogger Stakes Claim, U.S. NEWS, PERSONAL 
FINANCE (Sept. 18, 2009 11:24 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2009/09/
18/frugalista-debate-one-blogger-stakes-claim [https://perma.cc/9FUD-XBQT]. 
 294 This could be addressed by remedy of estoppel proposed infra Section V. A. Eligibility – Phantom 
Marks. 
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instability.295 For example, that a mark may share a common word with many 
others, such as “cola” in both Pepsi-Cola296 and Coca-Cola,297 is acceptable 
given that consumers will look to the unique mark aspects for identity instead 
of the common portion.298 In this vein, the word “Jesus”299 was registered to 
a clothing company after an initial denial due to prior marks300 including the 
word.301 The PTO accepted the applicant’s argument that the mark would be 
a “satisfactory addition to the already robust field of Jesus marks already 
peacefully coexisting in the clothing field.”302 
That the board was swayed by this image of peaceful coexistence in a 
competitive field did not tether JesusTM to maintaining that outlook. The 
mark was transferred to Jesus Jeans S.R.L. by the time proof of the mark’s 
commercial use was required,303 even though in the intervening time those 
two words, “Jesus Jeans,” had been granted as a trademark to a different 
company for the same products.304 In a brief opposing another trademark 
registration, “Jesus Surfed,” the “Jesus Jeans” owner claims305 to have 
successfully enjoined over sixteen other uses, including “Jesus” on clothing. 
Those would-be partial uses had the distinguishing elements that the 
 
 295 See Lee B. Burgunder, Can the PTO Find Its Way with Jesus?, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
63 (2015). For proposed relief, see infra Section V. A. Eligibility – Phantom Marks. 
 296 PEPSI-COLA, Registration No. 0824151. 
 297 COCA-COLA, Registration No. 1752201. 
 298 T.M.E.P. §1207.01(d)(iii) (2007) (“Third-party registrations may be relevant to show that the 
mark or a portion of the mark is descriptive, suggestive, or so commonly used that the public will look to 
other elements to distinguish the source of the goods or services.”). 
 299 As with other historic and widely recognized names as marks, a likelihood of confusion as to any 
endorsement by the individual known as Jesus, or his right to publicity, is not a critique by the PTO. 
However, in light of modern dilution law’s enjoinment of “conjured mental association” sans actual 
confusion supra note 254, one could argue against this mark for dilution of “Jesus” by blurring. The 
question of allowing for rightful incentives arises, because there is, of course, no complainant party 
available to argue for the protection of this particular word. Supra Section IV. How Trademark Turned 
on Itself, A. Anti-Competitive Incentives. 
 300 Taking “Jesus” alone without a more distinctive element is an abstraction that ends in circular 
reasoning. The PTO misappropriated statute by accepting this basic logic: the mark does not convey 
source, therefore it is not confusing, therefore it may be used to convey source. T.M.E.P. §1207(b)(iii) 
(2007) (“Additions to marks may be sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion if the matter common 
to the marks is not likely to be perceived by purchasers as distinguishing source because it is merely 
descriptive or diluted.”). 
 301 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 75866210 (filed Dec. 7, 1999). 
 302 Basic Trademark S.A., Supplemental Response to Office Action, Serial No. 75866210 (Aug.13, 
2004). 
 303 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (2006) (detailing a five-year window after registration). 
 304 JESUS JEANS, Registration No. 3379848 (following the same initial rejection and subsequent 
success based on the “vast field” of similar marks, as did the first). 
 305 Notice of Opposition, Jesus Jeans S.R.L. v. Anton at 2–3, (T.T.A.B. Feb. 20, 2013) available at 
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91209383&pty=OPP&eno=1. 
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objecting mark holder once relied upon in arguing for its own registration; 
but these claims nonetheless were all squashed. 
This chaos stems from granting powerful marks without thorough 
evaluation of possible consequences.306 It is also not independent of the fact 
that Jesus’ desirability and flexibility as a mark is derived from cultural 
goodwill.307 The consumers’ right to wear articles portraying the term is a 
protectable matter of their free speech. Alternatively, if merchandising308 is 
a legitimate goal for brands, could consumers also not wish to bask in 
promotional products celebrating the value of cultural icons? Either of these 
may conceivably constitute primary function of the mark in the eyes of 
consumers – and in context both would be illegitimate to the purpose of 
trademarks. Recently, the mark, “What Would Jesus Do?”309—originally was 
owned for entertainment services by an aspiring Christian TV star—then it 
was successfully cancelled and overtaken by celebrity producer Tyler Perry. 
This is despite the phrase’s historical past310 and contemporary primary 
association in the general public’s mind with trendy bracelets of the 1990s, 
as well as the fact that this action is, most likely, not what Jesus would do.311 
Sloganeering has blossomed in trademark law,312 yet secondary meaning is 
only utilized in the affirmative of creating trademarks, even if it may count 
as an overwhelmingly positive force for preserving a non-mark, expressive 
status. 
2. Expansion of the Mark Definition and Form 
Trademarks are no longer limited to symbolic words and images. 
Registrations have been attempted and granted for marks in forms evoking 
any one of the senses, from sound to smell to taste.313 The Supreme Court has 
said that “almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning” may be 
able to serve a trademark function, when it established that a single color, if 
 
 306 Remedy proposed infra Section V. B. Eye on the Ball. 
 307 Supra Section II. B. Inherent Goodwill. 
 308 Grimes & Battersby, supra note 41. 
 309 WHAT WOULD JESUS DO?, Registration No. 3748123. 
 310 Instances of this phrase can be found as early as 1896. See, e.g., CHARLES MONROE SHELDON, IN 
HIS STEPS (1897). 
 311 Phillip P. Mann, Tyler Perry Snatches ‘What Would Jesus Do’ Mark, IP LITIG. BLOG (Jul. 8, 
2014), http://www.iplitigationblog.com/2014/07/articles/blogroll/tyler-perry-snatches-what-would-
jesus-do-mark [https://perma.cc/9ME6-QRWX] (discussing previous owner’s allegations that she 
approached Tyler Perry’s production company pitching this title for a reality show, which he rejected 
before subsequently submitting his own application for the mark). 
 312 See Burgunder, supra note 85, at 80. 
 313 See Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and Cherry-
Scented Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 773 (2005). 
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consistently imbued with meaning, may be a protectable mark.314 The 
opinion referenced well-established source-indicators, including the shape of 
a Coca-Cola bottle and the sound of the National Broadcasting Company’s 
three chimes.315 That chime certainly serves a strong objective in trademark, 
and is not perceived as a product feature, which many other non-traditional 
qualities have been ruled to be.316 
However, the broadening realm of possible marks carries with it new, 
detail-oriented questions. For color marks, meaningful boundaries have been 
suggested. Standardization methods such as the shade-specifying Pantone 
color system317 have been offered in response to the possibility of a finite 
range of colors that could be quickly depleted. De facto color functionality 
has been respected, such as black318 being a practically useful color for 
consumers to standardize or minimize machinery, as in one case dealing with 
a boat motor.319 The evolution of color marks has been closely watched and 
well-reasoned.320 
Specificity in defining other non-traditional marks may pose a 
challenge.321 Sound-marks are featured on the USPTO website in MP3 
format with written descriptions.322 Some descriptions include words and the 
particular identity of a perceived speaker,323 others state technical details 
 
 314 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (the Supreme Court held that color 
alone could be registered as a trademark, provided it had acquired distinctiveness through secondary 
meaning). 
 315 Id. at 162 (citing Registration No. 696,147 (Apr. 12, 1960) for the shape and Registration Nos. 
523,616 (Apr. 4, 1950) and 916,522 (July 13, 1971) for the sounds). The Court also even referenced a 
trademarked scent of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread. Id. (citing In re Clarke, 17U. S. P. Q. 2d 1238, 
1240 (T.T.A.B. 1990)). 
 316 In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006). 
 317 See PANTONE, http://www.pantone.com/pages/pantone/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/BAF5-
GA84]. 
 318 Black was also granted aesthetic functionality for its appropriateness for Halloween and 
bereavement floral arrangements, supra note 142. 
 319 Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 320 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (discussed supra notes 314–315 
and accompanying text); Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 
(2d Cir. 2012) (holding that Louboutin’s lacquered red sole on footwear is indeed a protected mark, but 
it only has distinctiveness when it contrasts with the color of the shoe upper); Craig Summerfield, Color 
as a Trademark and the Mere Color Rule: The Circuit Split for Color Alone, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 973 
(1992) (analyzing case law leading toward the Qualitex ruling). 
 321 Amanda E. Compton, Acquiring a Flavor For Trademarks: There’s No Common Taste in the 
World, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 340 (2010), available at http://scholarly.law.northwestern.edu/
njtip/vol8/iss3/1. 
 322 See, e.g., Trademark “Sound Mark” Examples, UNITED STATES TRADEMARK AND PATENT 
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademark/soundmarks/trademark-sound-mark-examples. 
 323 Id. (76280750 Twentieth Century Fox—entertainment—”D’OH” (Homer Simpson character), 
playable at http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/soundmarks/76163189.mp3 for Registration No. 3411881). 
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such as “B flat clarinet,”324 and a few may be simply descriptive, for example, 
“roaring lion.”325 If this level of distinction varies in description, the scope of 
protections for different marks would logically follow. Does MGM hold the 
rights to even a gentle lion “roar,” or the higher-pitched cry of a lion cub, or 
a child imitating a lion’s roar? 
Currently, there are no standard formats for submission of taste, smell, 
or other non-traditional marks. The validity of any written description as it 
is translated among widely varying consumer sensory capabilities is hard to 
access, and thus to harness as a trademark registration and enforcement 
tool.326 Nonetheless, for the sake of registrants, descriptive standardization is 
a necessity, lest we expect them to seek out and independently compare their 
own perception of each existing mark to their own registration.327 
The issue of faithfully capturing consumer perception328 will only face 
more trials in determining functionality for new pairs of sensory marks and 
diverse product types.329 For instance, while courts have deemed a 
medicine’s taste to be an untrademarkable functional aspect,330 the TTAB 
granted a mark for scented sewing thread.331 Here is a thought experiment to 
illustrate the important crossover point between the two: initially, the 
primary function of candles was to provide light. Whoever first added scent 
to the wax created a unique, recognizable product,332 and scented candles 
might have initially been synonymous with that one innovative candle maker 
as a source.333 
If the first scented candle company would have desired to receive 
protection for its introduction of scent to the candle, what would it have had 
for options? If a robust mental link to the source is formed by this addition 
of scent, should that innovation be preserved by a scent trademark? Of 
course, this could have introduced profound implications to the candle 
 
 324 Id. (76575743 Infone—Concierge arrangements—B flat clarinet playable at 
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/soundmarks/76575743.mp3 for Registration No. 3014502). 
 325 Id. (73553567 MGM – Entertainment – Roaring Lion playable at 
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/soundmarks/73553567.mp3 for Registration No. 1395550). 
 326 Compton, supra note 321, at 354. 
 327 Id. at 357. 
 328 Supra, Section III. Primary Purpose. 
 329 See Jay M. Burgett, Hmm, What’s That Smell? Scent Trademarks—A United States Perspective, 
64 INTA BULL. 5 (2009). 
 330 Supra note 316. Not all medicines have this function; even otherwise identical products will vary 
in taste or lack thereof. 
 331 In re Celia, d/b/a Clarke’s Osewez, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (TTAB 1990). 
 332 Id. The board considered that the applicants had added scent as a feature, that it was not naturally 
occurring, to be in their favor. 
 333 Id. The board also found in the applicant’s favor his being the sole marketer of this product 
feature. Additionally, there was proof of the consumers’ understanding of the scent as source. 
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industry. Perhaps that first scent mark would have influenced each candle 
maker to produce only a certain scented candle, with each scent trademarked 
to its producer to differentiate itself from others. However, this would have 
made the trademarked scent of the candle serve a purpose, by inducing 
consumers to purchase a particular candle from a particular company 
because of its scent. So it seems, at least in this line of reasoning, the court 
might not hinder competition with a scent trademark, by avoiding a 
determination or prediction consumers would place more value on the scent 
for its own sake, rather than as a mark of distinctiveness (as an indication of 
source). 
The benchmark of distinctiveness varies with each new attribute—
product pairing as well. Where soda flavor was held to intensely detailed 
genres of generic demand,334 the specific “floral scent” of sewing thread was 
found to be acceptably arbitrary.335 Some circumstantial considerations have 
been developed. The World Intellectual Property Organization addresses 
some of these for olfactory marks specifically: 
Scents which are the natural odor of a product or are otherwise common for the 
type of goods applied for are likely to be needed by other traders and are 
difficult to register, e.g., the scent of “vanilla”—a normal ingredient in many 
food products, would not be registrable for “confectionery”. Scents normally 
applied as masking agents in products are also lacking in distinctiveness e.g., 
the scent of “pine” in relation to disinfectants and the scent of “lemon” in 
relation to “dishwashing liquid”. However, the application of a scent to a 
product not normally scented would have considerably more potential to be 
registrable.336 
Determining what is “normal” is left to the judgment of the PTO and 
TTAB. At some point in time, scented candles became normal.337 Vanilla, 
pine, and lemon scented candles all individually became normal as well, 
even though they were not “masking” another unpleasant scent, or common 
ingredients, initially. While this standard respects scents used commonly as 
masking agents, it does not go as far as acknowledging potentially inherent 
 
 334 See Leib, supra note 145. 
 335 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1239. 
 336 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, 
INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS (March 30, 2007), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_17/sct_17_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/TTG2-KW3J] (the 
United States is one among 73 member states). 
 337 Facts & Figures, NATIONAL CANDLE ASS.N, http://candles.org/facts-figures-2/ [http://perma.cc/
9886-LWJM ] (estimating the American candle industry at $2 billion yearly, before accessories) 
(“Fragrance is by far the most important characteristic impacting candle purchases today, with three-
fourths of candle buyers saying it is ‘extremely important’ or ‘very important’ in their selection of a 
candle.”). 
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benefits other scents may carry across different products. Vanilla’s 
commonality among food products does not directly explain its present role 
perfuming pencils, erasers, phone cases, teddy bears, trash bags, valve oil, 
drawer-liners, or pacifiers.338 It is not an established norm within these 
industries to add a masking scent, and those objects are not typically valued 
for their odor. However, the possibility that such disparate manufacturers all 
choose vanilla has not been considered as an indication of some inherently 
desirable nature it has,339 which should be protected from the limitations of 
trademarking. 
Non-traditional marks have also developed for buildings.340 Some 
building designs have been considered distinctive enough to be granted 
protection against structural mimicry,341 and courts have gone both ways on 
protecting buildings’ depiction through other media.342 It is most 
theoretically troubling when depictions of buildings from the public 
perspective, such as a view from a street corner, are threatened. These turn 
common sights into private property. A shop in New York City called “Fishs 
Eddy” has been on the receiving end of two such mark defenses. In 1998, the 
shop was ordered to cease and desist selling a china pattern that featured a 
silhouette of the city skyline, due to the newly established trademark343 of the 
Chrysler Building spire.344 The New York Times reported on the shop 
 











 339 See supra Section II.B. Inherent Goodwill; Hughes, supra note 14. 
 340 See, e.g., Keri Christ, Edifice Complex: Protecting Landmark Buildings as Intellectual Property 
– A Critique of Available Protections and a Proposal, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1041 (2002). 
 341 Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 541 (5th Cir. 1998) (enjoining golf course 
company from re-creating an iconic hole of the Sea Pines golf course as a part of its re-creation of iconic 
locations. The relevant consumers in this case would be interested in patronizing a collection of famous 
courses and therefore also potentially discriminating enough to appreciate the symbolism. Presumably 
these golfers would also then be aware they were, in fact, not at the mark “source,” and would not be 
confused). 
 342 Rock and Roll Hall of Fame v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 755 (6th Cir. 1998) (overturning 
district court ruling for the Hall of Fame as an “accessible, public, well-known landmark”). 
 343 Registration No. 1126888. 
 344 David W. Dunlap, What’s Next? A Fee for Looking?, N.Y. TIMES: DESIGN NOTEBOOK (Aug. 27, 
1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/27/garden/design-notebook-what-next-a-fee-for-looking.html 
[http://perma.cc/QZ68-VQ3J]. 
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owner’s refusal: “‘How can they say we can’t use the Chrysler Building?’ 
she asked. ‘We wanted to do a plate that represented New York City. Leaving 
off the Chrysler Building would be like leaving off the World Trade 
Center.’”345 Sixteen years later, in a new cease-and-desist letter, the New 
York Port Authority demanded Fishs Eddy do just that, claiming the same 
china pattern would wrongfully “evoke thoughts of the Port Authority, the 
twin towers, W.T.C. and the September 11th terrorist attacks.”346 This claim 
was despite the china pattern predating September 11th attacks, or 
construction of the W.T.C. It also illustrates the issue of granting mark 
holders such broad rights that they would assert ownership over the ability 
to evoke thought on a national tragedy—a salient example of culturally 
created meaning which one does not attribute to the Port Authority.347 No 
motions have been filed, though they could prove interesting in addressing a 
public domain for stylization of famous marks. 
Freedom to depict artistically the real world was recently confronted in 
University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc.348 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that inclusion of the 
trademarked Alabama uniforms was artistically relevant to portraying 
famous school football moments,349 and that artist Daniel Moore’s First 
Amendment right to capture that moment overrode the need to even consider 
possible consumer confusion (so long as it was not explicitly misleading).350 
Media harshly criticized the University of Alabama for the vigor with which 
it pursued art and even seemingly minor “infringements” such as hand-
decorated cookies.351 Moore’s high-quality paintings were protected, even 
 
 345 Id. 
 346 David W. Dunlap, Port Agency Tells Store to Drop 9/11 Items, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/nyregion/port-authority-of-new-york-and-new-jersey-tells-store-
to-drop-9-11-items-.html?_r=1 (The irony of the original quote foreshadowing a complaint from the 
World Trade Center was likely not lost here, as same journalist wrote both pieces sixteen years apart). 
 347 As does the “Let’s Roll,” examined supra note 93. If it seems peculiar the frequency with which 
serious events become the subject of these disputes, it is helpful to keep in mind the problematic incentives 
that have propelled “trademark bullying” as a means to assert mark rights (see supra Section IV. A. Anti-
Competitive Incentives) Mark rights claimed on issues of sensitive nature could logically less likely to 
be “let go” by the other users. 
 348 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 349 Id. at 24–25. 
 350 Id. at 25. 
 351 Jon Solomon, University of Alabama Aggressively Defends Trademarks. How Far is Too Far?, 
AL (Nov. 17, 2013 7:00 AM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/11/university_of_alabama_
aggressi.html [https://perma.cc/2F7M-QXEF]; The University of Alabama also owns the standard 
character word mark, “Alabama,” even though it is a state name (see supra note 42 regarding state 
insignia) it is not protected for any inherent goodwill (supra Section II. B. Inherent Goodwill) or 
communicative or informational value, (supra Section III. A. Of the Mark), and is apparently distinctive 
in and of itself. In fact, its athletic director, Bill Battle, leads a substantial portion of the entire collegiate 
sports protectionist wave as founder of the Collegiate Licensing Company mentioned supra note 137). 
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when sold commercially, as expressive art in a traditional format. There are 
many similarly motivated, but less classically artistic, mark uses that will 
find achieving protection to be more challenging. 
The University of Alabama football uniforms are only marks because 
they have acquired distinction and meaning via the university and fans’ 
support of a high-profile football team. Expansion has affected not only the 
type of marks available, but also conceptions of the owners of them. Cultural 
investment352 in a mark is hard to define, no matter the scale (e.g., communal, 
geographical, jurisdictional) used, but universities are a helpful microcosm 
where much of the community is clearly delineated and where employees, 
enrollees, and alumni are all claimed as essential members in creating the 
“meaning” of a school.353 While fans may be happy to see third parties pay 
for the use of marks, institutions that turn on their own alumni, and even 
current students, may find them asking, “whose identity is it, anyway?” 
Theory grants mark ownership to the controller of the quality a mark 
conveys.354 If the primary quality implied by a school’s trademark, to relevant 
buyers, were student comradery, students might logically be the 
“controllers” of that quality. Very little has been said about pinpointing a 
conveyed quality of a mark, but if marks were recognized for inherent 
meanings, the results may help align law with public conception. It is 
especially curious when school marks extend past institution name and 
official mascots to the likes of student-originated chants and nicknames. 
Courts have ruled against third-party shirt makers emblazoning their sporty 
chemises with “Rock, Chalk, Jayhawk,” thus establishing the catchphrase as 
property of the University of Kansas.355 Then, a parody, “Barack, Chalk, 
Jayhawk” was printed on shirts by a student group leading up to the 
presidential election. Initially the school granted permission, but later 
revoked it (despite the usage touching upon parody, political speech’s high 
First Amendment regard, as well as non-commercial, free distribution of the 
shirts).356 Student groups at the University of Texas in Austin were upset by 
similarly selective permission to use school symbols, which they regarded as 
an “identity and an identifier for everyone who goes to school here, on or off 
 
 352 See Section II. B. Inherent Goodwill. 
 353 Perhaps the undeniable community of stakeholders invested in a university explains the 
proliferation of cases and scholarship focusing on institutions of higher learning in regards to trademarks 
overstepping their bounds. See supra notes 105, 116, 134, 181, 227 & 351, and accompanying text. 
 354 Supra note 178. 
 355 Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Kan. 2008). 
 356 Obama T-shirt Concerns KU, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, July 22, 2008, at 1. 
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the field[.] One person shouldn’t be able to be a Longhorn more than 
another.”357 
3. Expansion of the Infringement Definition 
The globalization of markets has effects beyond distancing product 
source. Market definitions’ initial bounds respected the regional nature of 
business. However, 21st Century competition must be re-evaluated, as 
gradually more brands are able to make the whole world their market. 
Whereas marks previously coexisted, a completely valid mark may be 
bowled over through no fault of its own, but by the gravitational pull of a 
larger brand expanding.358 Who should take precedence? Should it be the first 
user, the first filer, or whichever party is the more effective user of a mark? 
With the introduction of dilution law, is fame now the legally dominant 
factor?359 Continuing forward in this new environment, when a lack of 
“assiduousness” has been held against mark holders in court, it seems the 
expectations of aggressive defense expand along with the concomitant 
possibilities of direct competition. This puts small mark holders in a 
precarious situation. Not only do they have little defense from being 
“swamped” by a more dominant mark, but they also may be obliged to police 
marks stringently in ways they would not have expected, out of their region, 
and out of pocket. That is a large burden that disadvantages smaller mark 
holders. 
Hitching the trademark wagon to consumer perception has pulled it into 
the intersection of a new societal force, escalating mass media and 
information technology.360 The amount of commercial content an average 
U.S. consumer is exposed to daily is staggering. Large brands can use this 
access as a means for rewriting consumer impressions, consequently taking 
control of marks. Certainly, instances of reverse-confusion361 should be more 
common and perhaps easier to prove. However, if more senior, but smaller 
 
 357 Lauren Reinlie, Longhorn Logo Policy under Review, DAILY TEXAN (UNIV. TEX.-AUSTIN) via 
U-Wire, Sept. 26, 2002, http://www.dailytexanonline.com/2.8480/longhorn-logo-policyunder-review-
1.1261255. 
 358 E.g., “Dream Team” owned by IHSA. Supra note 274. 
 359 Wallpaper Mfrs. Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 762 (C.C.P.A. 1982) 
(precedent to the contrary) (“Trademark rights are neither acquired nor lost on the basis of comparative 
popularity  . . . .”). 
 360 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 973 (1993) 
(“Trademarks are often selected for their effervescent qualities, and then injected into the stream of 
communication with the pressure of a firehose by means of mass media campaigns. Where trademarks 
come to carry so much communicative freight, allowing the trademark holder to restrict their use 
implicates our collective interest in free and open communication.”); see also Margreth Barrett, Domain 
Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 
973, 979–81 (2007). 
 361 See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text. 
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mark holders are able to make that case, courts may not intervene on the 
older mark’s behalf, given current precedent. 
V. THE COMEBACK 
Rapid expansion of trademarks, and the public’s understanding of them, 
reflects the modern world where brands hold very real power. Many certainly 
carry a wealth of cultural information, which will not be erased any time 
soon—nor should that be the goal of reform. The power of a Starbucks 
trademark to sell merchandised mugs, for example, is a valorization 
unintended by the foundations of trademark law, but now part of a legal and 
business evolution: a transformation of what reputational advantage can 
encompass. Many significant diversions from trademark intent are harmless, 
even commercially and expressively beneficial, and could not have arisen 
without a liberal approach to trademarks. 
However, as the potential contained in marks has magnified, minimal 
attention has been paid to the costs of encouraging these possibilities. Most 
expansions emerged via reasonable circumstances, but left the door open to 
often flawed and counter-productive applications. There is good news 
though: while the fundamentals underlying trademark law cannot fully 
explain the current universe of marks, they do retain the power to rein in such 
contradictions. 
A. Eligibility – Phantom Marks, Evidence and Estoppel 
The constant tug of trademark law toward less restriction has 
empowered what were previously known as “phantom marks.”362 Such marks 
are defined loosely and broadly enough to assert control over more rights or 
property interests than any mark holder could justifiably claim. So these 
spectral intellectual properties are, in a sense, very real. Their effects are 
magnified when “naked licensing”363 of the amorphous mark takes place. 
Combining the two creates a mark that means almost nothing—and can 
expand to stake claim over almost anything. 
To illustrate, we reexamine the trademarked blue Boise State turf.364 
Aside from the numerous functional advantages, the school effectively 
mandates naked licensing by compelling “users” to disclaim their lack of 
 
 362 In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting mark for having 
too many permutations to fulfill purpose of registration creating constructive notice third parties may 
comprehensively search through). 
 363 See supra Section II. A. Changing Nature. 
 364 Gallagher, supra note 103. 
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association to Boise State.365 The university admits there is no form of quality 
control, stating, “We just say, ‘[d]on’t imply that you’re related to Boise 
State, but good luck with your football program.’”366 These licensing 
agreements are, in fact, intentionally bereft of trademark meaning. However, 
it is difficult to hold the school blameworthy, as it may well be responding 
rationally to the present landscape rewarding and even demanding assiduous 
mark protectionism. 
Beyond severing the link of association, Boise has overreached its 
mark’s registration in these licenses. The mark registration includes an 
objective of “entertainment services, namely, the presentation of 
intercollegiate sporting events and sports exhibitions rendered in a stadium, 
and through the media of radio and television broadcasts and the global 
communications network,” and includes a description of “the color blue used 
on the artificial turf in the stadium.”367 However, Boise State has licensed 
turfs in red, and it claims to the public and the press the rights to any non-
green turf.368 No intercollegiate sporting events are played at several of the 
high school and even elementary school fields that have been “granted a 
license” by Boise.369 It is hard to imagine these schools could pose much of 
a threat to Boise State’s telecasting prospects in global communications 
networks, either.370 
Boise State’s apparent liberty from each tenet of its mark’s registration 
is troubling. The PTO limits applicants to one individual mark per 
registration, and though there are justifiable expansions as marks evolve, this 
one seizes an irrational scope of control. Poorly enforced limitations negate 
constructive notice, foster uncertainty and legal conflict, and oppose the 
public interest in free expression. Phantom marks are one of several issues 
that may be curtailed by a greater incorporation of estoppel into trademark 
law.371 If the mark described is a blue field, the owner has no proprietary right 
to every other color in the rainbow. One would hope that the PTO’s scrutiny 
would rise to the level of rejecting an application that read “any turf of any 
 
 365 Chadd Cripe, Here’s How Boise State Protects its Trademark on the Blue Turf, IDAHO 
STATESMAN: BRONCO BEAT (Sept. 23, 2011, 9:35 AM, updated on Sept. 24, 2011, 5:20 PM), 
http://archive.today/Z4yma. (“We have agreements that they won’t liken themselves to Boise State so 
there’s no confusion.”). 
 366 Id. 
 367 Registration No. 3707623. 
 368 Gallagher, supra note 103. 
 369 Cripe, supra note 365. 
 370 Id. 
 371 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(9) mentions equitable principles including estoppel as applying to the 
affirmative defenses against an infringement suit. The doctrine has primarily been enforced against mark 
holders who have acquiesced to would-be infringers, however, not been applied to cabin the mark to its 
registration’s bounds. 
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color, anywhere.” Judicial interpretation of marks may remedy these 
overreaches, but a great deal of mark activity only reaches the judiciary at 
the will of the mark’s owners. Outside circumstances, such as market 
positions, financial and political power, and sheer luck, may have more to do 
with a mark’s legal boundaries than litigated or regulatory determinations.                        
Mark holders should retain the ability to petition for expansion of their 
mark’s definition, but should also shoulder the burden of affirmatively 
justifying those expansions before acting upon them, perhaps with some 
minimal standards analogous to probable cause,372 including the claimant’s 
meeting an initial threshold of documentation and attestation. When one or 
both of these characteristics are present—(1) a mark’s scope now allegedly 
extends to an area beyond its original, core coverage, and (2) the mark is a 
junior mark—then that mark holder should be expected to introduce 
evidence, both registration and usage as well as, when relevant, consumer 
surveys, expert or eyewitness testimony of likely or actual consumer 
confusion, and documentary support showing or refuting specific 
infringement claims.373 This would discourage “strike suits” used as a tool to 
carve out greater mark territory, leveraging the power of a registered mark. 
Many will listen to even the emptiest of threats from a multinational 
corporation, and those who wisely ignore them do not set legal precedent. 
When they do, predatorily protracted litigation costs also favor the party of 
greater means, especially when balanced with the possibly fleeting value to 
junior users.374 
As noted previously, even a basic, unlegislated, or unregulated answer 
to wrongful intellectual property assertions may rest successfully in the 
weeds of several hundred years of Anglo-American law: Estoppel. Assertion 
of unapproved rights will garner less acquiescence out of intimidation if 
uncertainty is reduced where the opportunity arises. Estoppel clarifies 
boundaries and aids in slowing the creeping expansion of marks rights, and 
the consequences thereof. Expectations of trademark necessity staked out by 
this protectionism are too late to roll back, but this halts continual amassing 
of advantage. Applicability of estoppel is not limited to the text of 
registrations and could have great normative impact throughout the body of 
law. In Freedom Card Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., the Third Circuit left 
open this possibility, combining the statements made in a mark’s registration 
 
 372 Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (noting how the standard has been 
applied at the outset of tort cases). 
 373 Garden of Life, Inc. v. Letzer, 318 F. Supp. 2d 946, 966 (C.D. Ca. 2004) (both e-mail and website 
link evidence indicating both that the defendant sought to induce consumer confusion and that there was, 
indeed, actual consumer confusion). 
 374 Discussion of the fleeting, rare, and unpredictable time window of value, and free rider 
conundrum of petitioning for genericism. Kantorczyk, supra note 159. 
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with evidence that plaintiff presented of a term’s widespread popularity as 
dispositive of an alleged infringer creating consumer confusion.375 This is a 
rational avenue for cabining undisciplined expansionism, similar to the well-
established patent prosecution estoppel,376 though far less developed in 
trademark jurisprudence. 
B. Eye on the Ball 
A general lack of consideration is granted to the nature of marks 
themselves, which allows registration and fame to supplant logical 
robustness and commitment to consumer protection. Attempts at protecting 
broad iterations of marks may actually be attempts to claim ownership of the 
mark’s underlying nature, with tenuous ties to trademark law’s purpose. For 
example, the National Pork Board’s (NPB’s) right to the term, “the other 
white meat,”377 invokes a comparison to “the white meat” of chicken or 
fish.378 The NPB objected to similar analogies by several other meat 
producers. In 1997, after bringing suit against the Maine Lobster 
Promotional Council, the NPB settled out of court for the firm’s use of the 
slogan, “The Ultimate White Meat.”379 Cease-and-desist letters were sent to 
other users, one of which was a faux-advertisement on April Fool’s Day for 
canned unicorn meat dubbed “The New White Meat,”380 and the other, a 
humorous bumper sticker reading, “Muskrat: The new off-white meat.”381 
 
 375 432 F.3d 463, 476 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Whether we view . . . prior representations about the 
commercial viability of marks containing the word ‘freedom’ as judicial estoppel, an admission, waiver, 
or simply hoisting [the mark] by its own petard . . . “); see also Atl. Nat’l Bank v. Atl. Southern Bank, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133665, 13-14 (S.D. Ga. 2010) (looking to admissions of mark limitations in 
registration). 
 376 See T. Whitley Chandler, Prosecution History Estoppel, the Doctrine of Equivalents, and the 
Scope of Patents, 13 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 465 (2001). 
 377 THE OTHER WHITE MEAT, Registration No. 1486548. 
 378 While the National Pork Board did not clarify which meat pork was being compared to, the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) can offer guidance. USDA classifies red and white meats based 
on concentrations of myoglobin; ironically, they view pork as a red meat. See Fresh Pork from Farm to 
Table, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/
topics/food-safety-education/get-answers/food-safety-fact-sheets/meat-preparation/fresh-pork-from-
farm-to-table/CT_Index [https://perma.cc/XA4D-9T4M] (“Pork is classified a ‘red’ meat because it 
contains more myoglobin than chicken or fish.”). 
 379 Briefing: Another ‘White’ Meat, Pork Industry Settle, PHILLY.COM (Dec. 18, 1997), 
http://articles.philly.com/1997-12-18/business/25555073_1_consumer-prices-cyber-patrol-business-
software-alliance (“It’s always been our position that the pork producers couldn’t hog the term ‘white 
meat,’” said Susan Barber, adding her group was “as happy as pigs in mud”). 
 380 Nick Bilton, Unicorns. They’re Not the Other White Meat., N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 22nd, 2010 11:04 
AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/unicorns-theyre-not-the-other-white-meat/?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/69BE-JY8N]. 
 381 The National Pork Board Beats Up on Muskrats, IRREGULAR TIMES, 
http://www.irregulartimes.com/otherwhitemeat.html [https://perma.cc/5ECD-ZBG8]. 
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The NPB’s mark was likely initially suggestive, with the addition of 
“other” distinguishing it from “white meat,” a merely descriptive phrase.382 
Secondary meaning was established, and the mark is now inherently 
distinctive. With this new distinctive mark came an attempt to assert control 
over the phrase from which it originated. The implications of “other” are 
neither equivalent to “ultimate” nor to “new.” There is no reason to believe 
the distinctive mark’s meaning destroys or alters “white meat[‘s]” merely 
descriptive nature or negates the right of others to access it.383 That is the 
effective result of efforts when considered in aggregate. 
The Maine Lobster Promotional Council raised arguments of 
descriptiveness and a lack of consumer confusion, and the Maine Lobster 
Promotional Council felt the subsequent settlement was a victory.384 
Dilution, not legally vulnerable to those same defenses, was the argument 
accepted by the TTAB in prohibiting the salmon industry from using the 
slogan, “The Other Red Meat,” on grounds of blurring the NPB mark in 
2010.385 
Famousness controversially elevates a mark above concerns of 
consumer confusion, an element that was likely not created by these 
subsequent somewhat similar marks. The National Pork Council provided 
convincing evidence of fame through extensive commercialization of its 
mark and recognition of its mark in the public mind.386 Responses to a survey 
asking “Thinking about the slogan you just heard [THE OTHER RED 
MEAT], do any other advertising slogans or phrases come to mind?”387 
 
 382 As a term of classification used by government regulators see supra note 378, as well as the prima 
facie implications of plainly indicating a naturally occurring color of goods, the term would likely meet 
the definition of merely descriptive. T.M.E.P. §1207.01(d)(iii) (2007) (“[I]t is enough if the term 
describes one significant function, attribute, or property.”). 
 383 See Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 
1101 (2003) (criticizing the protection of descriptive marks as an unjustified restriction on commercial 
speech, given the context of proven secondary meaning applied by the PTO—though this partial-mark 
example is “white meat” being effectively, though not legally, restrained). 
 384 Carole Sugarman, Pork vs. Lobster: A Fight Over White, WASH. POST (Jul. 16, 1997), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/food/1997/07/16/pork-vs-lobster-a-fight-over-
white/7b026241-5bb3-4a71-acfa-504f1c8e2a35/ [https://perma.cc/W42T-M9PM ] (“[The] dictionary 
definition of ‘white meat’ includes any light-colored meat, such as pork, veal and the breast of poultry. 
‘That means white meat is a generic term for pork,’ he said. ‘That means that the pork producers can’t 
get an exclusive right to it.’ What’s more, the lobster council’s ads were clear about who was promoting 
what, Keller said. ‘There wasn’t anybody reading this stuff who would confuse a lobster with a pig.’”) 
 385 Nat’l. Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479 (T.T.A.B. 2010). 
For clarity, this case was about salmon, as marketed by the Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., while the 
former case, discussed see supra note 384, concerned lobster marketed by the unrelated Maine Lobster 
Promotion Council. Id. (“It’s an interesting question of trademark and First Amendment law. And we 
love lobsters.”). 
 386 Id. at 1490. 
 387 Id. 
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supported a claim of dilution.388 In response to the survey, the salmon 
applicant charged that this query improperly suggested another slogan 
should come to mind, but the court deemed the survey was properly phrased 
for the “precise question” the survey intended to answer.389 
The possibility that the closest advertising slogan associated with “The 
Other Red Meat” could be insignificant to the overall effect of the mark was 
not considered. Accepting the premise that famous associations either 
dominate or should dominate all other potential meanings prioritizes those 
famous marks automatically. Establishing a mark’s primary purpose in the 
consumer’s mind390 is necessary to both consumer-protection and 
information-transmission trademark justifications. These justifications are 
abandoned when investigation of the conception is left incomplete or is 
distorted by a purely commercial point of view.391 
Where a court deems the marks to be highly similar, its own reading of 
facts could be interpreted to support the alternate conclusion if consumer 
interpretation was prioritized. Colors of meat being of “precious few from 
which to choose” buttresses the mutually exclusive reality in this particular 
case; one product cannot be “the other white meat” and “the other red meat” 
at the same time. That both parties intended to express healthy attributes 
follows, despite the fact that each color implies distinctly different nutritional 
properties. Thus, a mark not only conveys its own positive attributes, but 
may bring to mind that from which it is distinguishing itself. The “mental 
processing” of using an analogy within each category is not necessarily a 
common message of marks, but it is a valuable tool of language and 
communication, which is being foreclosed.392 
Attempts to seize an underlying descriptor in, or to deal with blindness 
to, the mark’s own nature, illustrate some pitfalls of the cognitive dissonance 
between modern practice and theoretical underpinnings. The solution is to 
compel more faithful representation on both sides. First, a reason is not 
provided for why a mark’s behavior is not considered in aggregate by the 
TTAB. An overbroad mark can push forward unnoticed—which is not in the 
best interest of the interconnected trademark system. The most accurate 
conception of a mark’s nature comes from a complete picture of its actions. 
Second, dilution, as it violates the fundamental public interest in facilitating 
consumer perception, can be countered by opposition: mark holders trying 
 
 388 Id. at 1497–98 (interpreting the fact that 35% of respondents thought of the other slogan indicates 
a high degree of likely association). 
 389 Id. at 1490–91. 
 390 See supra Section III. A. Of the Mark. 
 391 See Brown, supra note 6. 
 392 See supra note 116. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
210 
to contradict a diluter’s interests. The drawing of distinctions, the use of 
communicative tools, and the right to a merely descriptive term are all being 
harmed through the ungrounded “logic” of dilution. Finally, while it is 
challenging to keep in mind the differences between two separate arenas of 
competing business interests, consumer perception is not equivalent to 
consumer commercial perceptions. 
C. Out of Bounds 
In Jesus Jeans, had the PTO incorporated estoppel into its argument for 
there being a mark, subsequent marks mentioning Jesus would have been 
allowed entry into the “robust field of Jesus marks already peacefully 
coexisting.”393 However, a more realistic consideration of several such marks 
might find their purposes to be non-trademark expression. Communication 
is a valid function of many goods.394 Owners can and should be allowed to 
construct a highly protected, famous trademark by imbuing meaning 
persistently. It is hard to understand how these valid acknowledgements can 
justifiably be reconciled with the almost complete doctrinal annexation of 
the public domain. 
Though a public domain is unacknowledged by the foundations of 
trademark law, so are scent marks and many other developments. The public 
domain, though, besides a cherished “remainderman” of intellectual property 
rights expressly provided in patent and copyright law,395 epitomizes the idea 
of the general commons, a vigorously protected public space, and the 
expressive rights of all people, whether to create, to transmit, or to receive. 
Defending this terrain provides a benefit for society generally. Presuming 
that the TTAB reestablishes its responsibility to steward generification,396 
objectively egregious marks such as “three-peat”397 will no longer “refuse to 
lose.”398 Further balance will be achieved whenever the doctrinal 
underpinning of protecting consumer expectations is applied more 
comprehensively to capture their perceptions, even when they lack a brand-
enhancing tinge. This is possible in many avenues, including expecting 
higher standards of consumer surveys, requiring tighter pleading and proof 
for a prima facie case of dilution, and more scrutiny of a trademark’s early 
dates, original meanings, and geographical scope during the initial mark 
registration process. 
 
 393 Supra note 302. 
 394 See Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 395 World Intell supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 396 Supra note 166. 
 397 Kantorczyk, supra note 159. 
 398 Supra note 206. 
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As established, there is no shortage of words with deeply embedded 
meaning,399 occasionally with inherent and cultural goodwill and inferences 
more significant than their standard dictionary definition.400 This is not to say 
that all marks must be culturally bland. Consumer segmentation is no 
mystery to brands heavily involved in trademark law.401 Texas Tech Univ. v. 
Spiegelberg found robust meaning in a college town as cause for more 
stringent trademark protection locally.402 The opposite reaction is to allow 
those vested in a community to freely enjoy and nourish their connection to 
a mark. Evaluated in regard to preserving competition, a place such as 
Lubbock, Texas, the home of Texas Tech University, is virtually the only 
place where the primary purpose of many purchases is to express identity as 
a Red Raider and where the request for red and black apparel is a ubiquitous 
demand. Similarly, “who dat” is free to become commercially associated 
with the Saints in the majority of the country; there is little harm in respecting 
the authors of its antecedent appeal deep in Louisiana. Depictions of city 
skylines403 and football plays404 carry their own intrinsic appeal. 
If proving acquired distinctiveness can be mandated for descriptive 
marks, perhaps trademark law should apply a similar burden to potential 
marks especially prone to other non-mark interpretations.405 The PTO, 
through its guidance in the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure,406 
draws upon common consumer interpretations; essentially, these 
interpretations are cognitive functions,407 organizing marks at large. As the 
public has been conditioned to infer the presence and meaning of a trademark 
from a small logo on the pocket area of a shirt,408 or the absence of any 
trademark or meaning thereof from the color of a vase of flowers,409 many 
other psychological reactions should be preserved for their functionality. 
 
 399 See, e.g., Sections II. B. Inherent Goodwill; II. C. Idioms and Atmospherics. 
 400 See, e.g., supra notes 50-52 (discussing “who dat” in historical and colloquial cultural depths as 
opposed to any formal dictionary entries). 
 401 See Desai, supra note 114. 
 402 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 524 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (“This is so because trademark rights are territorial 
in nature [quoting McCarthy, supra note 265, at § 26.27]. Therefore, the relevant territory which the court 
must consider in determining distinctiveness of the scarlet and black color scheme is not national, but 
local to Texas Tech. In this university town, a display of the scarlet and black color scheme on a game 
day (or any other day) is almost certainly a show of support for Texas Tech.”). 
 403 Dunlap, supra note 344. 
 404 See New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1276. 
 405 The T.M.E.P., supra note 24, offers guidelines for a common perception of different mark 
depictions. Supra notes 285–287. 
 406 The T.M.E.P., supra note 24. 
 407 See Hughes, supra note 14. 
 408 Supra note 287 (T.M.E.P. acknowledging connotation of mark placement to consumer). 
 409 Supra note 142. 
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Commitment to consumer perceptions would follow Vanessa Pierce’s 
suggestion to integrate consideration of functionality, that is, realism, when 
determining genus and, therefore, genericity.410 Likewise, the need for 
considering actual consumers, as well as a precise articulation of quality 
control detailed in McGuffey’s Boybands,411 would serve the doctrine well 
by realigning theory in conformity with practical considerations. Heightened 
scrutiny in granting marks that touch these bounds of inherent meaning is 
preferable to the functional advantages simply given to marks such as the 
Boise State field. 
D. Making the Calls 
As trademarks have bloomed and markets have fragmented, the 
abundance of “reasonable” product categories has complicated the task of 
analyzing mark applications. Further complications arise when attempting to 
determine what is “in the mind of” more specialized consumers.412 Especially 
as potential marks expand to non-traditional forms, and as mark holder 
influence looms larger than ever, the standards of registration cannot relax. 
To reboot the influence of consumer and informational intent upon 
trademark practice, the burden of better facilitating transparent trademarks 
could be in part placed on the applicants’ shoulders. A simple step in this 
direction would be implementing a brief “environmental scan” of existing 
usages of marks in applications for registration. While Section 13 of the 
Lanham Act allows for opposition to registration by any person who believes 
they would be damaged by it,413 as this article has illustrated, marks have 
been tending to expand on multiple fronts, not all of which are obvious from 
their registration. Putting the onus on the party receiving the property right 
of a mark to explain exactly what bounds it claims, within reason, seems like 
a rational allocation facilitating a functioning system. 
If this sounds burdensome, it is only commensurate with the newly 
granted ability to register without proof of commercial use, among many 
other fading restrictions. It also carries benefits even the most propertization-
right inclined registrant will recognize. Geographic boundaries to commerce 
are quickly becoming obsolete. Peaceful coexistence of similar marks is 
threatened, if not by others expanding into their territory, then by 
assiduousness or the pressure to act assiduously out of fear for their own 
sovereignty, and thus, the trademark’s validity. Dilution law aggravates 
potential unrest with its lack of consumer confusion. Delta Faucets and Delta 
 
 410 See Pierce, supra note 25. 
 411 See, e.g., McGuffey, supra note 153. 
 412 See, e.g., “frugalista,” supra notes 291-293. 
 413 15 U.S.C. §1063. 
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Airlines, both conceivably famous, strong marks, have likely addressed their 
nominal overlap, but could have conceivably come to an impasse.414 If, 
instead, a survey of similar marks currently being used in substantial 
commerce were necessitated, then statements about the potential mark’s 
distinctiveness could be proffered, as could agreements avoiding an overlap 
in category or territory or committing to avoid litigation. 
This type of pragmatism in applications is not limited to registered 
marks. Much of the criteria typically used in determining genericism and 
second meaning can be touched upon briefly to lend a small level of credence 
to the mark’s viability. Perhaps frugalista415 was granted on the assumption 
that it was frivolous as a relatively new portmanteau; the definition may have 
been unknown to the PTO, but certainly not the registrant. 
Effectively, this could compel registrants to formally acknowledge a 
public domain.416 One page of Google results would have been dominated by 
the unrelated publicity “Let’s Roll” was imbued with at the time of 
application.417 Whether an Internet search divulges a long history of “derby 
pie,”418 several enthusiastic, different user groups convey a mantra’s 
significance,419 or a consumer survey answers “who dat” with “New 
Orleans,”420 a mental leap to register a word or phrase as suggestive may 
separate the words from their dictionary definition, where they are 
synonymous with the product in the consumer’s mind. Descriptive partial 
marks protection should be restored, unlike the case of “white meat.”421 
As the range of marks available for registration and their commercial 
applications expand, serious efforts to standardize them should go beyond 
broadly worded descriptions. Why not, for example, make the Pantone 
number422 mandatory for colors to be deemed susceptible to distinction? 
 
 414 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418, 2002 WL 31643067 (hereinafter 
“Moseley Oral Argument”). In trying to understand the harm against which dilution law seeks to protect, 
Justice Ginsburg posed the hypothetical of Kodak entering a small market to sell monkey wrenches. Id. 
In particular, Justice Ginsburg questioned the existence of injury where there was no tarnishment to the 
trademark of “KODAK.” See id. Later in the argument, the example of “Delta” was used to understand 
the scope of protection where there existed a Delta Airlines, Delta Faucets, and Delta Peanuts. See 
generally id. at 22–23. 
 415 United States Patent and Trademark Office, supra note 292. 
 416 A similar theory has been put forth in articles such as Susan M. Richey, The Second Kind of Sin: 
Making the Case for a Duty to Disclose Facts Related to Genericism and Functionality in the Trademark 
Office, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 137, 195-208 (2010). 
 417 Bleicher, supra note 93 at 1874. 
 418 Kern’s Kitchen, 669 F. Supp. at 790 (assuming the search results outweigh the rejected 
“anecdotal” offerings). 
 419 Kantorczyk, supra note 159 at 207–08. 
 420 Davidson, supra note 52. 
 421 Bilton, supra note 380. 
 422 Pantone, supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Trademarks are simply not what they used to be.423 Expansion of the 
trademark’s reach has transformed this basic, intellectual property concept 
beyond its original, comparatively limited business purpose and effect. The 
relative ease of obtaining a trademark, coupled with the often exorbitant 
costs of battling an established mark holder, often deters even those with 
legitimate claims of use from challenging these famous—and therefore 
feared—mark holders. Given the difficulty and the small chance for success 
that non-mark holders or poorer, lesser known mark holders may face, the 
mutated mark holder opposing such persons is very likely able to defeat 
them: channeling its commercial influence and discouraging others engaged 
in innovation, expressive uses, as well as, perhaps, competition. Moreover, 
the broad extension of existing marks comes at a great cost to society, not 
just those whose private branding and marketing—who’s would-be uses of 
an expression—are stifled. Instead, the public policy fundamentals of 
consumer protection and market efficiency can be revived through critical 
analysis of a mark’s depth and breadth. 
Reform is in the offing. The regulatory and judicial understanding of 
the marketplace must be adjusted to the contemporary business reality of 
intense, disruptive, and rapid brand evolution. The answer to legal 
inconsistencies and overreaching marks is not backpedaling or more 
regulation, but to demand “inoculation” from a mark’s mutation: shifting the 
affirmative burden of justification to the mark holder. When a mark holder 
seeks broad expressive property protection, the holder demands expansive 
legal rights and economic clout. The holder seeks guarantees of dominance, 
and should meet a high burden to do so. With great power comes great 
responsibilityTM.424 
 
 423 See generally Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks—From 
Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1992). 
 424 WITH GREAT POWER COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY, Registration No. 85365090. 
